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Background: There are a variety of public health and social welfare motivations to 
reduce unintended pregnancies. Despite efforts to address this issue, approximately 45 
percent of US pregnancies are unintended. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) contraceptive 
mandate increased the availability of prescription contraceptives and reduced copayments 
starting in August 2012. Previously, 30 states had mandates requiring contraceptive 
coverage but without price reductions comparable to the ACA. Current literature has not 
determined the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on fertility and abortion rates. 
Methods: Fixed effects models were used to estimate the impact of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate on fertility and abortion rates, utilizing NCHS public-use Birth 
Files from 2007-2017 and CDC Abortion Surveillance Reports from 2008-2015. Models 
included variables to test the effect of state-specific mandates alone and interacted with 
the ACA. The fertility and abortion analyses included 50 and 15 regression 
subpopulations, respectively, allowing modeling by age group, race/ethnicity, or 
combined. Tests were run for model specification and robustness. 
Results: The best fit fertility model estimated a decrease of 4.277 births/1,000 
women (95% CI [-6.86, -0.22]) with an additional decrease in fertility of 0.844 
births/1,000 women (95% CI [-1.20, -0.49]) in states with mandates, equivalent to a 6.8 
and 8.1 percent decrease from the 2012 fertility rates, respectively. This translates to an 
estimated 299,179 births averted annually. Twenty-nine of the 50 subpopulations also 
estimated a statistically significant decrease in fertility.  
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The final abortion model estimated a decrease of 4.677 abortions/1,000 women 
(95% CI [-6.055, -3.299]) and an additional decrease of 0.877 abortions/1,000 women 
(95% CI [-1.347, -0.406]) for states with mandates. This estimated decrease represents a 
37.1 and 44.1 percent reduction from the mean 2012 abortion rate and translates to 
roughly 325,219 averted abortions annually. Fourteen of the fifteen regression 
subpopulations estimated a statistically significant decrease in abortion rates. 
Conclusion: The ACA contraceptive mandate decreased fertility and abortion 
rates for nearly all subpopulations in the analysis, with greater effects for younger and 
minority populations. Future federal, state, or insurance company policy should ensure 
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1.1 Overview and Significance 
A variety of public health and social welfare motivations have established a 
policy rationale for measures to help people avoid unintended pregnancies (Herd, 
Higgins, Sicinski, & Merkurieva, 2016; Sonfield, Hasstedt, Kavanaugh, & Anderson, 
2013; Wendt, Gibbs, Peters, & Hogue, 2012). In the US, the Department of Health and 
Human Services’ Healthy People 2020 objective was to decrease unintended pregnancies 
by ten percent by the year 2020 (Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 
2011). Despite these efforts, unintended pregnancy rates remain high. Of the 
approximately 6.1 million pregnancies in the US in 2011, 2.8 million (45 percent) were 
unintended (Finer & Zolna, 2016), which is among the highest rates in developed 
countries (Sedgh, Singh, & Hussain, 2014). 
Evaluating the impact of healthcare policy measures on unintended pregnancies is 
important for accountability and efficiency. It is especially important because current 
spending to avoid unintended pregnancies is already high, with industry experts 
estimating the size of the US contraceptive market to have been over $5 billion in 2015 
(Ugalmugale & Swain, 2017). The financing for contraceptives is divided among 
insurance companies, the US government, and out of pocket spending by the 
approximately 61.7 percent of the nearly 61 million women of childbearing age (15-44) 
in the US who currently use some form of contraception (Daniels, Daugherty, Jones, & 
Mosher, 2015). There has been an enduring element of family planning policies directed 




sense idea that lowering contraceptive cost barriers might help reduce unintended 
pregnancy rates.  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) mandate for coverage of 
preventive health services significantly changed how the healthcare system attempts to 
help people avoid unintended pregnancies. In March 2010, President Obama signed the 
ACA, which included a mandate for coverage of preventive health services (Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). The mandate was later defined to include all 
FDA-approved contraception, changing the out-of-pocket cost of all prescription 
contraceptives to $0 for most private health plans1 (Preventive care benefits for women, 
2020). 
Although the contraceptive mandate may be viewed by some as a victory for 
women’s reproductive health, it is politically controversial and many have sought to 
weaken or remove the mandate entirely (Charo, 2012; Guttmacher Institute, 2015). Both 
interest in and political action toward “repealing and replacing” or “repairing” the ACA 
increased throughout the 2016 election cycle and carried into Trump’s presidency. After 
the American Health Care Act (AHCA), introduced by House Republicans to replace the 
ACA, failed in March 2017, Trump’s administration changed strategy, citing the need to 
protect religious liberty to issue executive orders limiting insurance coverage of 
contraceptives. Two interim rules were announced in October 2017 (82 FR 47792, 2017; 
                                                 
1 There are two main exceptions to the ACA contraceptive mandate. First are grandfathered 
insurance plans, meaning insurance plans that started no later than March 2010 and have continued since 
that time without substantial benefit changes (Marketplace options for grandfathered health insurance 
plans, 2020). The second exception is that certain religious employers are able to request exemption from 
the contraceptive mandate. However, substantial decreases in the total amount paid for contraceptives since 
the implementation of the ACA contraceptive mandate have been documented, with the percent of women 
paying zero dollars out of pocket for OCPs increased from 15 percent to 67 percent between 2012 and 2014 




82 FR 47838, 2017) followed by final rules in November 2018 (83 FR 57536, 2018; 83 
FR 57592, 2018) that relaxed the criteria for gaining religious or moral exemption to 
providing insurance coverage of contraceptives. The Supreme Court ruled on July 8, 
2020 that the Trump administration has the legal authority to issue the final rules, which 
effectively reduce the amount of contraceptive coverage initially mandated by the ACA 
(Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 2020). 
The effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on women’s health outcomes would 
be crucial information to have in current and future policy discussions surrounding 
contraceptive coverage. It is especially important to determine the effect of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate requiring zero out-of-pocket costs specifically since economists 
argue that a zero price of any good decreases the good’s perceived value by the 
consumer. Thus, a zero copayment for contraceptives could lead to higher “sales,” but 
lower rates of adherence (e.g., women could receive automatic shipments of free 
contraceptives, but not bother to use them). 
The effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on fertility and abortion rates is 
further complicated because 30 states had already implemented some form of 
contraceptive mandate when the ACA contraceptive mandate went into full effect in 
January 2013 (Mulligan, 2015). These state mandates, however, did not have the same 
reach as the ACA contraceptive mandate for many reasons. First, they only affected 
women with private insurance. Second, they did not apply to women with employers who 
self-insured, and this accounts for approximately 60 percent of individuals who secure 
health insurance through their employer (Guttmacher Institute, 2020). Third they only 




coverage. Finally, many state mandates still required women to pay a copayment for 
contraception. In contrast, the ACA expanded the number of women with insurance. This 
is especially relevant because women with insurance are 30 percent more likely to use 
prescription contraceptives (Culwell & Feinglass, 2007a). The ACA also required 
insurance coverage of contraceptives and reduced the copayments to $0 for most plans. 
The greatest absolute decrease in contraceptive costs were for LARCs, which have 
relatively high upfront costs. Because the ACA expanded the number of people covered 
and reduced the costs of contraceptives beyond the state mandate, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that the introduction of the ACA contraceptive mandate led to modest 
reductions in fertility in states that had a state contraceptive mandate in place prior to 
2013, and larger reductions in fertility in states without a mandate in place before the 
ACA. 
Present scholarship has not yet sufficiently investigated how the ACA 
contraceptive mandate impacted rates of unintended pregnancies and abortions, the end 
goals of contraceptive health policy. As I will discuss in Chapter 2, past scholars have 
primarily investigated the impact of healthcare policy at the state level pre-ACA, where 
policies sufficiently differed from the ACA as to not be representative, or because 
scholars have studied other factors related to reproductive health, such as contraceptive 
usage rates, but not the direct impact of the ACA on unintended pregnancy rates.  
This dissertation will improve our understanding of the ACA contraceptive 
mandate’s impact on fertility and abortion rates by estimating the effect of the ACA 
mandate on all 50 states while also taking into account the 30 state mandates previously 




subpopulations to help identify effects specific to different segments of the population. 
This research will be of special importance in advancing our understanding of healthcare 
policy’s effect on historically underinsured and understudied populations, especially low-
income and minority women.  
In a political climate where the future of the ACA contraceptive mandate is 
uncertain, it behooves us to fully comprehend the effects of the law on reproductive 
health in order to present policymakers with a clear-eyed view of how their decisions will 
impact the Nation’s progress to its stated goals for women’s health. 
1.2 Research Aims 
There are two specific aims of this research: 
1. Estimate the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on fertility rates in the 
US during the 2007 to 2017 period and determine whether this effect differs 
by age group and race or ethnicity. 
2. Estimate the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on abortion rates in the 
US during the 2008 to 2016 period and determine whether this effect differs 





2.0 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Legislative History of Contraceptives 
Because a large part of this study requires interpreting changes in mandates and 
regulations, a brief legislative history surrounding prescription contraceptives in the US 
follows. 
For nearly 100 years, any medicine or device intended to be used for 
contraception and even information about contraception were technically banned in the 
US under both federal and state laws. The 1873 Comstock Act banned the interstate 
shipping of contraceptives or information about contraceptives and, following the passing 
of this law, 45 states implemented similar bans of contraceptives within the states. 
Although inconsistently enforced for the next nine decades, contraceptives first became 
legal for married couples in the US through the 1965 Supreme Court decision in 
Griswold v. Connecticut. This was followed by the 1972 Supreme Court decision in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, which extended this right to privacy to non-married individuals. 
Finally, the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade legalized abortion. Since these three Supreme 
Court decisions, much of the legislative and legal debate surrounding contraceptives has 
involved insurance coverage.  
By the late 1990s, several women’s health advocates, lobbyists, and politicians 
were trying to gather support for federal legislation involving insurance coverage of 
contraceptives. The federal legislation first proposed in 1997 was called the Equity in 
Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC). To promote EPICC, 
members of Congress cited Griswold v. Connecticut, which stated that “Congress should 




contraception” (1965). Up until this point, Title X funding, which was established in 1970 
to increase access to contraceptives for low-income women, was the only federal policy 
concerning contraceptive coverage. EPICC was introduced in Congress in 1997, 1999, 
2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 (Kuhn, 2007). After EPICC died in committee the first time it 
was introduced in 1997, many states in favor of EPICC began adopting state-wide 
contraceptive mandates, the first being Maryland in 1998 (Kuhn, 2007). See Section 2.1.1 
for a more complete discussion of the state-specific mandates. 
During the time period when EPICC was being introduced, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC, 2000) and the court decision in Erickson 
v. Bartell Drug Co. (Saubermann, 2002) found that it was discriminatory for an employer 
to not include prescription coverage of contraceptives if the health insurance plan covered 
other prescription drugs. Although many state mandates cited these decisions, the state 
mandates were limited and weak and many felt there was a need for a law at the federal 
level to require insurance coverage of contraceptives (Kuhn, 2007). For example, many 
states’ laws had a “conscience” opt-out clause, which EPICC did not have. These were 
viewed as a political advantage of state mandates but also led to weaker improvements in 
contraceptive access (Kuhn, 2007). 
However, several critics of EPICC feared potentially negative, unintended 
consequences if EPICC passed. Some critics believed that it would not reduce unintended 
pregnancies in the US because (1) it failed to address non-contraceptive determinants of 
unintended pregnancy (such as social or psychosocial determinants), and (2) it would be 
directed at women with health insurance, and thus would not address those without 




Furthermore, critics worried that because EPICC would only extend coverage to people 
who already have private insurance, EPICC’s political constituency, who tended to be 
wealthier and more educated, would lose interest in improving contraceptive access for 
all women, particularly those not covered by their own private insurance. There was also 
some concern that insurance companies might react by dropping all prescription 
coverage, thereby evading the mandate, conditional on insurance coverage of 
prescriptions, to cover contraceptives. Critics also believed that previous laws regarding 
contraceptive coverage upon which EPICC relied, including Title VII and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, were not sufficient to enforce mandated coverage of prescription 
contraceptives in all insurance plans (Kuhn, 2007). 
Research during the years that EPICC was being proposed supported some of 
these concerns. Culwell and Feinglass utilized data from the National Survey of Family 
Growth (NSFG) to study the change in prescription contraceptive use between 1995 and 
2002 based on insurance status (Culwell & Feinglass, 2007b). They utilized logistic 
regression to estimate the likelihood of self-reported use of a prescription-contraceptive 
and examined differential effects of private insurance, public insurance, or no insurance 
coverage. The authors controlled for various demographic factors and found that although 
overall prescription contraceptive use increased by three percent between 1995 and 2002, 
the change in the likelihood of prescription contraceptive use was only significant among 
women who had private insurance coverage, with the likelihood increasing by 5.5 percent 
(Culwell & Feinglass, 2007b). This provided evidence to support those who were 




Despite the obvious limitations of state mandates, their effectiveness among 
women with private health insurance led to greater support for contraceptive mandates in 
later legislation. The effect of this support was seen when President Obama signed the 
ACA in March 2010, which included a preventive health services mandate (Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). The ACA stated that “preventive health 
services” would be determined by recommendations from the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM). In January 2012, Kathleen Sebelius, then Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services, announced that the definition of women’s preventive health 
services would include required coverage of all FDA-approved contraception (Preventive 
care benefits for women, 2020). The US Supreme Court upheld the ACA in June 2012 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2015).  
Although the contraceptive mandate officially began on August 1, 2012, the 
mandate only applied to new insurance plans, which means that this requirement did not 
take effect for most plans until January 1, 2013 (Guttmacher Institute, 2015). The 
mandate includes religious exemptions as well as potential accommodations for entities 
not wanting to provide contraceptive coverage but who do not qualify as a religious 
organization. When the ACA contraceptive mandate went into effect, 30 states had 
mandates requiring that insurance companies cover all FDA-approved contraceptives if 
the insurance plan had any prescription coverage. However, some states’ mandates 
allowed exemptions for religious or moral reasons, limiting the reach of the mandates 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2015).  
Although the contraceptive mandate in the ACA may be viewed by some as a 




contested. Many political constituencies regularly seek to remove or weaken the mandate 
(Charo, 2012; Guttmacher Institute, 2015). The June 2014 Supreme Court decision on 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby, stating that for-
profit corporations that are “closely held” may be exempt from the contraceptive mandate 
if providing contraceptives, or even specific types of contraceptives, would conflict with 
the owners’ religious beliefs (Charo, 2014). The Court cited the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) in their decision, stating that forcing these types of corporations 
to follow the mandate would violate RFRA by imposing a “substantial burden” on the 
owners’ exercise of personal religious freedom. The Court stated that there existed a less 
restrictive option for providing contraceptive coverage to women at no cost—employees 
work directly with the insurance company to get coverage (which is reimbursed by the 
federal government) and the employer is completely absent from the discussion, a means 
made available to religious non-profit organizations—and that this option should be made 
available to “closely held” for-profit corporations with similar religious beliefs (Charo, 
2014).  
In the November 2016 election, Donald Trump won the presidency and 
Republicans maintained a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
Throughout the election and immediately after, the topic of “repealing and replacing” or 
“repairing” the ACA increased in popularity (Kaplan & Pear, 2017).  
On March 8, 2017, House Republicans first introduced into committee H.R. 1628, 
the American Health Care Act of 2017 (AHCA), which was designed to replace the ACA 
(AHCA, 2017). The AHCA would have impacted reproductive health through various 




decreasing the number of people with insurance coverage by an estimated 14 million. 
When evaluating the impact of the AHCA on reproductive health, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) estimated that Medicaid expenditures would increase under the 
AHCA due to covering “several thousand” more unplanned births due to decreased 
contraceptive access (CBO, 2017). Although the bill was able to get through two 
committees relatively quickly and move to the House floor on March 20, 2017, it was 
withdrawn by Speaker Paul Ryan on March 24, 2017 prior to a vote because of 
insufficient support for the bill to pass (Pear, Kaplan, & Haberman, 2017). Despite this 
defeat, both Speaker Ryan and President Trump pledged to continue fighting for 
healthcare reform, though not immediately (Pear, Kaplan, & Haberman, 2017).  
Starting in May 2017, Trump signaled his intention to move his agenda forward 
via executive orders and interim final rules by issuing an executive order concerning the 
protection of religious liberty (Trump, 2017). In this executive order, Trump directed the 
Secretaries of three government departments—Health and Human Services, Labor, and 
the Treasury—to consider modifying regulations surrounding the ACA’s mandates to 
more expansively address religious-based or conscience-based objections, meaning 
employer’s objections to insurance coverage of contraceptives. In October 2017, the three 
above-mentioned Departments announced two interim final rules that broadened the 
criteria for moral and religious exemptions to insuring contraceptives (82 FR 47792, 
2017; 82 FR 47838, 2017). Over 100,000 public comment submissions were made on the 
two interim rules before the December 2017 comment deadline and three lawsuits were 
filed against the interim final rules (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 




(83 FR 57536, 2018; 83 FR 57592, 2018). CMS-994-F2 allows religious exemptions for 
individuals or entities that object to mandated services based on “sincerely held religious 
beliefs.” This final rule still maintained the accommodation set up through the ACA 
where an institution or employer could remove itself from all discussions of contraceptive 
coverage but still allow its employees to directly secure contraceptive coverage from the 
insurance company. However, the final rule changed this accommodation to optional and 
voluntary, eliminating contraceptive coverage for some women (83 FR 57536, 2018). 
CMS-9925-F allows moral exemptions to nonprofits, small or closely-held businesses, 
educational institutions, and individuals who have non-religious but moral convictions 
opposing contraceptives. This rule gives these groups the same exemptions as religious 
entities, including the voluntary accommodation. These exemptions do not apply to 
publicly traded businesses or government agencies (83 FR 57592, 2018). 
Multiple lawsuits blocked these two final rules from being in effect until the 
Supreme Court issued its ruling on Trump v. Pennsylvania (2020) and Little Sisters of the 
Poor v. Pennsylvania (2020). On July 8, 2020, the Supreme Court issued a 7-2 decision 
on both cases, stating that the Trump administration had the legal authority to issue the 
two final rules (Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 2020). However, this ruling 
does not preclude future administrations from changing these exemptions and the 
Supreme Court returned the case back to lower federal courts where it will likely be 
argued whether the new rules are “arbitrary and capricious” in a way that violates the 
Administrative Procedure Act (Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 2020).   
The fate of contraceptive mandates is far from certain for all or subsets of the US 




the issue, and the partisan divide over the ACA’s mandates for contraceptive coverage 
will likely persist into the future. Legislation surrounding contraceptives and 
contraceptive coverage in the United States remains strongly contested and very likely to 
continue evolving over the foreseeable future. The need for carefully executed studies of 
policy impact will endure.  
2.1.1 State-Specific Mandates 
Because state-specific mandates were in place in the majority of states and 
because these mandates will be incorporated into this analysis, this section further 
discusses the specifics of the state mandates. As mentioned previously, by the time the 
ACA contraceptive mandate officially started on August 1, 2012, 30 states had some 
form of contraceptive mandate. No additional states have since added a state-specific 
contraceptive mandate. Twenty-eight of the 30 states had mandates created by legislative 
acts. The remaining two states—Michigan and Montana—had their mandates created via 
attorney general ruling, both in 2006. All 30 mandates require insurance coverage of all 
FDA-approved prescription contraceptives if the health insurance plan offers any 
coverage of other prescription medications. Twenty-one of the 30 state mandates include 
a religious exemption to the required contraceptive coverage.  
Mandates were put in place over a 13-year period, starting with Maryland in 1998 
and ending with Colorado in 2010. Figure 1 graphs the new state mandates and 
cumulative state mandates over time, showing that over half of the mandates were 
enacted between 1998 and 2001. The state mandates were in place for at least a couple 
years and in some cases over a decade before the ACA contraceptive mandate went into 




ACA contraceptive mandate, so these different types of mandates are chronologically 
distinct and the effects of each are more distinguishable.  
There appear to be some geographic patterns in terms of the states with 
contraceptive mandates. Figure 2 maps the states with contraceptive mandates in red, 
showing the greatest concentration of states with mandates to be in the West, Southwest, 
Mid-Atlantic, New England, and central Midwest regions. These geographic patterns 
give further support to the idea that a state mandate is less a random event, but instead an 
event driven by specific characteristics of each state and shared in common among states 
within a given region. A full list of the states and years of contraceptive mandate 
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Figure 1: New States and Total States with 
Contraceptive Mandates in the US, 1998-2010






As a result, it seems reasonable to assume that the enactment of a state-specific 
contraceptive mandate was not randomly distributed across all states. Instead, it seems 
highly likely that the states that implemented contraceptive mandates prior to the ACA 
contraceptive mandate may be systematically different from the states that did not have a 
mandate. These factors will be taken into account in the development of the methodology 
for this analysis.  
2.2 Fertility Rates and Trends in the United States 
Understanding the trends in US fertility rates provides important context to 
understanding the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on fertility rates. Figure 3 
shows the US crude fertility rates (births per thousand women ages 15 to 44) from 1950 
to 2017 for the population as a whole, showing a rise through 1960 (generally attributed 





decline in the 1960s and 1970s is generally attributed to the increasing availability of 
prescription contraceptives. The fluctuations seen since the 1980s can largely be 
explained by changes in the economy, where increasing economic uncertainty decreases 
the birthrate. The Great Recession started the most recent declining trend in fertility rates, 
with the last several years having the lowest US fertility rates on record.   
  
Looking at the trends in fertility rates by age group reveals more complex trends 
and is essential in understanding the differential impact of the ACA contraceptive 
mandate on different age groups. Figure 4 shows the age-specific fertility rates for the 
same time period as Figure 3, showing the general increase in average mother’s age. The 
same peak in fertility rates is seen in 1960 for all age groups, but is most pronounced for 
the 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 age groups. Although the age-specific fertility rates were very 
different for the 15 to 19 and 20 to 24 age groups from 1950 through 1980, after 1980 
they decreased in roughly the same parallel pattern through 2017, both ending much 




















Figure 3: US Crude Fertility Rates, Ages 15-44, 1950-2017




34 and 35 to 39 age groups were roughly parallel during the entire 1950 to 2017 time 
period. Both groups had a general decline through 1980 followed by a general increase to 
roughly the same fertility rates in 2017 as in 1950. The 40 to 44 group had the least 
pronounced change over the time period and ended with fertility rates in 2017 at roughly 
two thirds of the 1950 fertility rates. Finally, the 25 to 29 age group started with lower 
fertility rates than the 20 to 24 group through 1980. From 1980 to 2000, these two age 
groups had almost identical age-specific fertility rates. In the following 17 years, the age-
specific fertility rates for the 25 to 29 group remained roughly constant while the rates for 
the 20 to 24 group dropped. It was not until 2017 that the age-specific fertility rates for 
women ages 30 to 34 became the highest of all of the age groups.  
 
Just as it was important to understand trends by age group, looking at trends in 
crude fertility rates by race or ethnicity helps to provide greater context for understanding 
the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on subpopulations. The Hispanic 


















Figure 4: US Age-Specific Fertility Rates, 1950-2017
15–19 years 20–24 years
25–29 years 30–34 years
35–39 years 40–44 years




with a rapid drop in fertility rates starting in 2008. The non-Hispanic Black/African 
American and American Indian or Alaska Native populations had roughly parallel 
fertility rates through the early 2000s, but the fertility rate for American Indian or Alaska 
Native populations has decreased faster than all other racial subgroups, with an 
approximate 50 percent decrease in the fertility rate between 1990 and 2017. The non-
Hispanic White and Asian or Pacific Islanders have had the closest fertility rates during 
this period, with the rates becoming even closer after 2009.  
The fertility rates for the entire US have been generally declining since 1960. 
However, there is considerable variation when looking at fertility rate trends among 
subpopulations. This research uses these variations as a context for understanding the 
ACA contraceptive mandate and as evidence to support running individual regressions by 






2.3 Unintended Pregnancy Rates, Trends, and Consequences 
Since the purpose of a contraceptive mandate is to help decrease unintended 
pregnancies, it is important to understand the prevalence and trends for unintended 
pregnancy in the US. Unintended pregnancy generally occurs under one of three 
conditions: 1. contraceptive failure, 2. incorrect or inconsistent use of contraceptives, or 
3. no contraceptive use (Black, Gupta, Rassi, & Kubba, 2010). A contraceptive mandate 
would likely not influence the first condition (unless the mandate induces switching to a 
method with higher efficacy), but may influence the second and third conditions by 
increasing affordable access to contraceptives. Contraceptive failure will be discussed 












































































Figure 5: US Crude Fertility Rates by Race or Ethnicity, Ages 15-44, 1990-2017
American Indian or Alaska Native Asian or Pacific Islander
Black/African American, Non-Hispanic Hispanic or Latina
White, Non-Hispanic




The unintended pregnancy rate in the US is generally decreasing, though remains 
much higher than most Western countries. Measuring and reporting unintended 
pregnancy is difficult and, in the United States, not undertaken annually, making it 
difficult to determine granular trends across time. Many studies document the difficulty 
of obtaining valid measures of pregnancy intention (Joyce, Kaestner, & Korenman, 2002; 
Rackin & Morgan, 2018). Post-pregnancy measures of intention are subject to revision 
bias and prospective measures are seldom available, so these data should be interpreted 
with caution. Figure 6 combines data from three different studies to show estimates in the 
US unintended pregnancy rate between 1981 and 2011. The first paper by Henshaw 
reported estimates for 1981, 1987, and 1994 (Henshaw, 1998).2 The other two papers 
were both written by Finer and Zolna and reported estimates for 2001 and 2008 in the 
first article and 2008 and 2011 in the second article (Finer & Zolna, 2014; Finer & Zolna, 
2016).3 It could be that the different groups of authors used slightly different methods, so 
the estimates after 2001 may not be methodologically comparable to the prior trends 
shown in Figure 6. The unintended pregnancy rate in 2008 was nearly the same rate as in 
1981, but otherwise there appears to be a general decline in the unintended pregnancy 
rate over time. Although there has not yet been a full update with the 2013-2015 data, one 
study using NSFG data found an estimated 15 percent decrease in the unintended 
pregnancy rate overall between the pre-mandate (2008-2010) and post-mandate (2013-
                                                 
2 The NSFG data used by Henshaw categorized a birth as unplanned (i.e., unintended) if the 
woman indicated she was using contraceptives when she became pregnant and that the pregnancy occurred 
either earlier than wanted or that she did not want to become pregnant ever again. A birth was categorized 
as intended if the woman had not been using contraception and that she did not care whether she became 
pregnant. 
3 Both papers by Finer and Zolna also used NSFG data to categorize retrospective pregnancy 
intention. They follow the same definitions as Henshaw except they do not include contraceptive use or 




2015) time periods. Women with government-sponsored insurance had an even higher 
estimated decrease in the unintended pregnancy rate of 37 percent (MacCallum-Bridges 
& Margerison, 2020). 
  
As with the fertility rate data, it is important to understand how unintended 
pregnancy varies by subpopulation, especially given that fertility rates vary considerably 
by subpopulation. Figure 7 breaks out the aggregate unintended pregnancy rate from 
Figure 6 by age group for 2001-2011. There is considerable variation in the unintended 
pregnancy rate across age, with the highest rate consistently for women ages 20 to 24 and 
the lowest consistently for women over 35. The greatest decrease in the unintended 
pregnancy rates in this time period were for women ages 20 to 24 and 15 to 19, though all 
age groups experienced a decrease between 2008 and 2011. Because of this, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that the younger age groups would experience the greatest 
decrease in fertility rate due to the ACA contraceptive mandate. The ACA has a 




























Figure 6: US Unintended Crude Pregnancy Rate, 
Ages 15-44, 1981-2011




health insurance plans at no additional cost, which may increase the effect of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate on this age group even more. 
 
It is important to distinguish the difference between the unintended pregnancy 
rate and the percent of pregnancies that are unintended. Figure 8 reports the percent of 
pregnancies in the US that were unintended by age group between 1994 and 2011, with 
the highest percent for women ages 15 to 19 and the lowest for ages 30 to 34. There is a 
general decrease in the percent of pregnancies that were unintended with increasing time 
and increasing age, but there is variation in that trend across age groups. A quick 
comparison of Figures 7 and 8 may seem paradoxical because women age 20 to 24 had 
the highest unintended pregnancy rate in Figure 7, but the second highest percent of 
pregnancies that are unintended in Figure 8. This is because pregnant women ages 20 to 
24 are less likely to have an unintended pregnancy than teenagers (reflected in Figure 8), 



























Figure 7: Unintended Pregnancy Rate 
by Age Group, 2001-2011
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35+




higher overall unintended pregnancy rate per thousand women. Assuming a utilitarian 
objective of reducing the total number of unintended pregnancies, then efforts should be 
focused on subpopulations with the highest rates rather than the highest percent of 
pregnancies that are unintended. 
  
As with age, racial or ethnic differences in the unintended pregnancy rate will 
likely affect the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on those subpopulations. 
Figure 9 breaks down the aggregate unintended crude pregnancy rate from Figure 6 by 
racial or ethnic category from 2001 to 2011. The non-Hispanic White population had the 
lowest unintended pregnancy rates throughout the time period and the least amount of 
decline between 2008 and 2011. The non-Hispanic Black population had the highest 
unintended pregnancy rate and a moderate decline between 2008 and 2011. Although the 
unintended pregnancy rate for the Hispanic population started out parallel to that of non-
Hispanic Blacks between 2001 and 2008, this population experienced a sharper decline 
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Figure 8: Percent of All Pregnancies that were 
Unintended by Age Group, 1994-2011
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that younger minority subpopulations stand to gain the most in terms of unintended 
pregnancies avoided due to the ACA contraceptive mandate. 
  
All this said, however, the causes of unintended pregnancy include more than just 
contraceptive access. Other factors like discontinuation, improper use, and non-use could 
dampen the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on fertility rates. Research on the 
causes for the high unintended pregnancy rates have proposed several explanations 
briefly discussed earlier in this Section. Although the sperm meets egg story of 
conception is simple, the pathways to an unintended pregnancy are complex and variable. 
Models of the pathways can also be complex and varied. 
 Bounded rationality models invoke agents who undertake constant weighing of 
costs and benefits of continuing to use the contraceptive method, perceived fertility, and 
perceived ability to access abortion in the event of an unplanned pregnancy (Black et al., 
2010; Forrest & Frost, 1996; Jaccard, Helbig, Wan, Gutman, & Kritz‐Silverstein, 1990; 































Figure 9: Unintended Crude Pregnancy Rate 
by Race/Ethnicity, Ages 15-44, 2001-2011
White, Non-Hispanic Black, Non-Hispanic Hispanic




ambivalence toward pregnancy obscuring the agent’s certainty that there are stable 
benefits from pregnancy avoidance (Brückner, Martin, & Bearman, 2004; Layte, McGee, 
Rundle, & Leigh, 2007). Another theory suggests that the planned versus unplanned 
dichotomy is unrealistic and that pregnancy intentions fall along a spectrum rather than 
being easily dichotomized (Augustine, Nelson, & Edin, 2009). A related study concluded 
that the traditionally-used measure of pregnancy intention may overstate unintended 
pregnancy rates because current assumptions in the measurement constructs do not reflect 
current reproductive practices and attitudes (Mumford, Sapra, King, Louis, & Buck 
Louis, 2016). These theories and proposed models of contraceptive use behavior play a 
role in the relationship between contraceptive price and contraceptive use and will be 
discussed further in Section 3.1. 
2.4 Contraceptive Use, Trends, and Failure Rates 
Since contraceptive method use rates prior to the ACA contraceptive mandate 
affect our ability to detect the impact of the mandate4, awareness of pre-mandate trends in 
contraceptive use is necessary to appropriately model the mandate’s effect on the fertility 
and abortion rates. Figure 10 shows the breakdown of contraceptive method use for 2002 
through 2017. Similar to the unintended pregnancy data, contraceptive use data are also 
derived from surveys. Data are not reported annually, which makes trends more difficult 
to discern, but still provide some helpful context. The percent of women using any form 
of contraceptives remained relatively constant from 2002 through 2017, though the 
contraceptive method mix changed. The percent of women using the pill or male or 
                                                 
4 For example, if some sub-groups already have very high rates of contraceptive use, ceiling 
effects would dampen the visible impact of the ACA. Similarly, if sub-groups have high rates of surgical 




female sterilization decreased while the percent using IUDs increased. In spite of these 
changes, overall use rates of the pill alone or sterilization alone are still higher than IUD 
use rates. Since IUDs have a higher typical-use effectiveness rate, one would expect 
fewer unplanned pregnancies due to contraceptive failure in populations with higher IUD 
use as well as overall fewer unplanned pregnancies, ceteris paribus. 
 
As was also the case with fertility and unintended pregnancy rates, it is important 
to understand how contraceptive use varies by subpopulation because that will influence 
how the ACA contraceptive mandate impacts outcomes. The three panels of Figure 11 
show contraceptive use by three different age categories to highlight differences in use by 
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Figure 10: US Contraceptive Use and Method, 
Women Ages 15-44, 2002-2017
Female sterilization Male sterilization Pill
Intrauterine device (IUD) Other hormonal methods Male condom
Other No current use




percent, and 75 percent of women using any contraceptive in the three age groups from 
youngest to oldest, respectively. The percent using either female or male sterilization is 
the most different across ages, with less than two percent use among those ages 15 to 24 
and nearly 50 percent for women ages 35 to 44. Because the ACA contraceptive mandate 
will have no effect on those in partnerships using permanent sterilization, it is reasonable 
to hypothesize that the contraceptive mandate would have a smaller estimated impact on 
older populations. Condoms or other non-hormonal methods, which have higher failure 
rates than any hormonal contraceptive method, are used more often in younger age 
groups. Among people already using contraception, the ACA contraceptive mandate 
would have the largest effect in terms of avoiding unintended pregnancies in populations 
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Figure 11.1: Contraceptive Use, 
Women Ages 15-24
Female Sterilization Male Sterilization
Pill Intrauterine device
Other hormonal method Condom
Other method No current use







Variation in contraceptive use across race or ethnic groups can also help predict 
the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate. The three panels of Figure 12 show 












1995 2002 2008 2012
Figure 11.2: Contraceptive Use, 
Women Ages 25-34
Female Sterilization Male Sterilization
Pill Intrauterine device
Other hormonal method Condom
Other method No current use
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Figure 11.3: Contraceptive Use, 
Women Ages 35-44
Female Sterilization Male Sterilization
Pill Intrauterine device
Other hormonal method Condom
Other method No current use





Black, and Hispanic. The three categories all have roughly 25 percent using either male 
or female sterilization. The non-Hispanic White population has the highest pill or IUD 
use and the highest overall use of any contraceptive. The ACA contraceptive mandate 
would likely have the least impact on this population of the three subgroups. Non-
Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics have about the same total percent of sterilization plus 
hormonal contraceptive use—just above 40 percent—though Hispanics use condoms and 
other methods at higher rates than non-Hispanic Blacks. Again, this provides more 
evidence that minority populations are likely to have a relatively higher estimated impact 
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Figure 12.1: Non-Hispanic White Contraceptive Use, 
Women Ages 15-44
Female Sterilization Male Sterilization
Pill Intrauterine device
Other hormonal methods Condom
Other Methods No current use
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Figure 12.2: Non-Hispanic Black Contraceptive Use, 
Women Ages 15-44
Female Sterilization Male Sterilization
Pill Intrauterine device
Other hormonal methods Condom
Other Methods No current use
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Figure 12.3 Hispanic Contraceptive Use, 
Women Ages 15-44
Female Sterilization Male Sterilization
Pill Intrauterine device
Other hormonal methods Condom
Other Methods No current use





In addition to age and racial or ethnic differences in contraceptive use, there is 
also evidence of differences in failure rates across subpopulations. There is a great 
amount of literature on the failure rates of various contraceptives. These studies obtain 
their data from one of two major categories: clinical trials or surveys. There are various 
benefits and drawbacks from both types of data. For example, clinical trials gather data 
prospectively and perhaps may be able to better monitor adherence. These results, then, 
would be more likely to show the failure rates during perfect use, or the contraception’s 
efficacy. Survey data, then, are useful to show the contraception’s effectiveness, or the 
failure rates during typical use. However, survey data are most often gathered 
retrospectively, and there are often issues of over-reporting of contraceptive adherence 
(Trussell, 2008). Thus, it is helpful to use information from both types of studies or 
systematic reviews of a large number of studies to obtain a more complete picture of 
various contraceptive methods’ failure rates. 
There are multiple demographic factors (e.g. age, socioeconomic status (SES), 
ethnicity) and behavioral factors (e.g. ambivalence, accuracy of information, or access to 
services) that impact the actual effectiveness of a specific category of contraception for 
the median woman in each sub-demographic (Black et al., 2010). However, on average, 
studies have found that contraceptive effectiveness generally follows this ranking in 
descending order: sterilization, LARCs with hormonal components (e.g. Mirena, 
implants), copper IUDs, SARCs (e.g. injectables, OCPs, patch, ring), barrier methods 
(e.g. condom, diaphragm), and natural methods (e.g. rhythm) (Black et al., 2010; Kost, 




2010; Trussell, 2008; Trussell, 2011). Often also documented in these studies are the one 
year continuation rates of each contraceptive method.  
Even if women have greater access to contraceptives because of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate, that does not necessarily translate into a direct reduction in the 
fertility and abortion rates because of the intervening impact of contraceptive failure or 
misuse, with typical-use failure rates varying across contraceptive methods. 
Understanding the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on a subpopulation’s 
fertility rates is especially complex if contraceptive failure rates vary significantly across 
subpopulations. Decisions regarding contraceptive use are complicated and the pathways 
that help calculate the likelihood that a specific individual’s contraception will fail are 
also complex and intertwined with socioeconomic status. Although the ACA mandate is a 
clear policy, the effect of the same policy will be very different for subpopulations.  
2.5 Abortion Use and Trends 
Similar to the discussion of fertility rates in Section 2.2, trends in abortion rates 
provide necessary context to understanding the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate 
on abortion. Figure 13 includes both the total count of abortions and the percent of 
abortions by age group for 2006 through 2015. These data include recorded abortions 
voluntarily reported by states. The count of abortions has decreased approximately 24 
percent during this ten year period. Women between ages 25 and 34 are contributing an 
increasing proportion of the abortions over this time period. Abortions by women ages 20 
to 24 account for a somewhat smaller proportion of total abortions while women ages 15 





To further understand the interaction between age and abortion use across time, 
Figure 14 plots the abortion rate by age group for this same ten year period. The 
population-level abortion rate is also plotted with the dashed black line, which shows a 
declining trend in abortion rates nationwide during the study period. Women ages 20 to 
24 have the highest rate throughout the ten year period. Women ages 15 to 19 and 20 to 
24 have roughly parallel trends and decrease the most of all of the age groups. Women 
ages 25 to 29 and 30 to 34 have a moderate and roughly parallel decline. The three 
remaining age groups—less than 15, 35 to 39, and over 40—have little change in 
abortion rate during this period. These data support the hypothesis that the ACA 
contraceptive mandate will have the greatest impact on the abortion rate for women 



































Figure 13: Total Abortions and Percent 









Finally, abortion rates by race or ethnicity help provide context to anticipating and 
understanding the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on each subpopulation. 
Non-Hispanic Blacks have the highest abortion rates and non-Hispanic White have the 
lowest rates. The Hispanic and non-Hispanic Other subpopulations have the most similar 
rates and are also closest to the average abortion rate for all races and ethnicities 
combined. The Hispanic subpopulation had a 43.2 percent decrease in abortion rates 
during this time, which is the greatest decrease of the racial or ethnic groups. The other 
three racial groups had decreases ranging between 24.1 and 31.5 percent. Because the 
non-Hispanic White population has the lowest abortion rates, it is reasonable to 
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2.6 Non-Cost Barriers to Contraceptive Use 
Although cost is an important barrier to contraceptive use, there are still 
additional non-cost barriers to all forms of contraceptives and perhaps further barriers to 
more effective LARCs.  
One study attempting to find the role of cost in limiting contraceptive access used 
focus group discussions and interviews with 45 low-income women in Boston between 
March 2007 and January 2009 (Dennis & Grossman, 2012). Authors worked to identify 
all barriers to prescription contraceptives and to gauge interest in obtaining 
contraceptives over-the-counter in the future. The women who participated cited several 
issues with current means of obtaining prescription contraceptives, including costs for 
copays and clinic visits, required clinic visits, limits on the number of packs that could be 
obtained at a time, and, for the 47 percent of the women who had insurance, limits on 























Figure 15: Abortion Rate by Race or Ethnicity, 
Ages 11-44, 2008-2016
Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black
Non-Hispanic Other Hispanic
All Races/Ethnicities Combined




had switched from their preferred and more effective method to condoms because they 
could obtain them either at a lower cost or for free. 
Most of the women interviewed seem to support over-the-counter contraceptives, 
but raised concerns about costs and patient safety. Although most women felt cost and 
time pressures from required clinic visits, they seemed to think that it helped improve 
safety, particularly for women starting to use contraceptives or for women with other 
medical conditions. Authors cited additional concerns for women on Medicaid who 
currently pay zero copayments for contraceptives, but who might face costs for 
contraceptives if they became available over-the-counter (Dennis & Grossman, 2012).  
This article supports the idea that, even in a state that has insurance mandates 
requiring prescription contraceptive coverage, not all low-income women have ready 
access to contraceptives, particularly the most effective contraceptives that may be more 
expensive. These findings are also significant to note because even if cost barriers are 
eliminated by enforcing zero copayments for contraceptives, there are still barriers in the 
form of office visits, limits on the numbers of packs that can be purchased at a time, and 
the time window for when additional packs can be purchased. Inasmuch as women in the 
study who were on Medicaid and had zero copayments for contraceptives still cited these 
barriers as significant, it would be worthwhile to pursue means to reduce these barriers. 
Another important barrier to contraceptives is the time involved in obtaining 
prescriptions, particularly when they must be obtained monthly, as is the case with 
SARCs. For example, Foster, et al. found that receiving a one-year supply of OCPs was 
associated with a 30 percent reduction in the odds of an unplanned pregnancy and 46 




month or three months of OCPs (Foster, Hulett, Bradsberry, Darney, & Policar, 2011). 
Even if monetary costs go to zero, the rate of unplanned pregnancies may not change if 
time costs are not also changed or if obtaining contraceptives (especially OCPs) does not 
become more convenient. 
Beyond these general factors applicable across all contraceptive types, there could 
be additional unique barriers when considering the shift from SARCs to LARCs. Xu, et 
al. conducted a study with NSFG data from 2006 to 2008 to identify the determinants of 
IUD use (Xu et al., 2011). The authors found that, when compared to women using 
injectables, IUD users were more likely to be older, to be married, to have at least one 
child, to have a higher income, and for the respondent’s mother to have a higher 
education. The authors conclude that IUD users are different from women using SARCs 
and other LARCs.  
These results suggest that changing the price of IUDs alone may not result in a 
greater number of women using IUDs. That said, there may be alternate explanations for 
why these data seem to suggest IUD cost does not impact use rates. For example, Xu, et 
al. states that as of 2005 the practice guidelines and FDA recommendations no longer 
state that nulliparous women should not use an IUD. Perhaps this change in guidelines 
will influence clinicians’ recommendations and uptake among women previously not 
using the IUD. The authors also state that the trend for wealthier women to use the IUD 
at higher rates could be an example of wealthier individuals taking advantage of new 
technologies sooner, so as the IUD becomes more common, other income groups may 




As we see from Xu, et al., it is not clear whether LARCs, particularly IUDs, are 
used frequently in younger populations. However, a study by Rosenstock, et al. shows 
that younger populations, including teenagers, have LARC continuation rates as high as 
older populations (Rosenstock, Peipert, Madden, Zhao, & Secura, 2012). Furthermore, 
younger populations were more likely to be dissatisfied with SARCs. This study suggests 
that providing LARCs to younger populations could be successful not only in terms of 
continuation, but also in terms of increasing satisfaction. Ayadi, et al. also found that 
increasing the provision of prescription contraceptives at zero cost among low-income 
teenagers in Florida and Georgia increased contraceptive use and reduced teen 
pregnancies (Ayadi, Kuo, Adams, & Gavin, 2012). 
In sum, these studies show that even if all monetary costs related to contraceptives 
were removed, contraceptive use may not increase as much as expected due to other 
barriers. It is still unknown whether mandating zero copayments will be a large enough 
incentive for women to overcome other remaining barriers and increase utilization, or if 
removing cost barriers will only have a minor effect on overall utilization (while 
potentially shifting the utilization toward more effective but more expensive LARCs). 
2.7 Other Fertility Impacts of the ACA 
The ACA contraceptive mandate is just one small part of the ACA, which had a 
major impact on health insurance availability and healthcare costs. Several aspects of the 
ACA affected the reality of having a potential future child. The ACA increased the 
availability and quality of health insurance and at times at lower premiums. Having good 
and affordable health insurance would make quality health care both during pregnancy 




Some aspects of the ACA, such as requiring zero-cost preventive care and regular 
immunizations, would make the expected healthcare costs of an additional child lower 
than before the ACA. It would not be surprising, then, if as the expected total cost of a 
child decreased, the demand for that good increased. 
One potential though less direct impact of the ACA on fertility was via increased 
infertility coverage and increased use of Artificial Reproductive Technology (ART). As 
part of the ACA, states were required to create state-specific Essential Health Benefits 
(EHB) benchmark plans to list out specific types of coverage that must be included in 
health insurance policies offered on the state’s Marketplace. Twenty-four states included 
infertility coverage in their EHB benchmark plans for the 2014 to 2016 time period (see 
Appendix Table 2 for list of States). Some, but not all, of these states had state-level 
legislation already in place that required insurance plans to have some form of infertility 
coverage. Although EHBs are only enforced for individually-purchased plans and 
employer group coverage, many self-insured employers may feel pressure to cover the 
same list of mandated benefits in their state’s EHBs in order to offer competitive benefits. 
It seems likely, then, that a substantial proportion of women in at least 24 states 
experienced a dramatic price decrease in infertility services at the same time the ACA 
contraceptive mandate came into effect. Figure 16, which shows the count of ART cycles 
per year, shows an average two percent increase per year from 2007 through 2013, then 
increases of 5.6 percent, 7.4 percent, and 8.6 percent for each year between 2014 and 
2016, respectively. This seemingly changed rate could be due to any number of factors 
outside of better insurance coverage for infertility benefits, but it seems non-trivial to 




formerly cost tens of thousands of dollars. Although the CDC’s 2018 Fertility Clinic 
Success Rates Report cites 1.9 percent as the proportion of US-born infants who are 
conceived via ART each year, these births are disproportionately to older mothers. The 
absolute effect of better infertility insurance coverage may not be playing a substantial 
role on changing fertility rates overall, but may have a more pronounced effect among 
older age groups. 
  
2.8 Research on the Effect of the Contraceptive Mandate 
Current literature has not drawn a definitive conclusion about how the ACA 
contraceptive mandate has impacted fertility and abortion rates. Literature has either 
focused on the impact of state-specific mandates implemented prior to the ACA 
contraceptive mandate (and occasionally as a means of estimating the impact of the then-
future ACA) or has studied the ACA’s impact on some other reproductive health factor, 
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Figure 16: Number of ART Cycles per Year, 
Women Ages 15-44, 2007-2016
Source: "2016 Assisted Reproductive Technology National Summary Report." CDC, 





In general, the literature antedating the ACA intended to estimate the possible 
impact of the forthcoming ACA contraceptive mandate based on state mandate results. 
These papers use a variety of methods (difference in difference, fixed effects) and data 
sources (Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS), Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), US Census) to study a wide range of 
outcome variables (contraceptive use, unintended births, birth rate, fertility rate, abortion 
rate, STD rates). The main findings are mixed, but generally show a small decrease in the 
birth rate and unintended birth rate for some sub-populations (Atkins & Bradford, 2014; 
Dills & Grecu, 2017; Gius, 2013; Johnston & Adams, 2017; Magnusson et al., 2012; 
Mulligan, 2015). These papers, however, only examined the effect of weaker state 
contraceptive mandates that themselves only impacted a small subset of the population. 
This is especially important because state mandates only impacted those with private 
insurance (especially pre-ACA, a generally older, whiter, and wealthier population), and 
we would expect a universal contraceptive mandate to have the greatest impact on the 
subsets of the population with the highest rates of unintended pregnancy (younger, non-
white populations). As a result, these studies likely underestimated the overall potential 
impact of the ACA because state mandates generally did not impact the populations we 
would expect the ACA’s mandate to most impact. Seven articles representing this 
category of research are discussed in further detail. 
The most common statistical method used is difference in difference (DID), 
utilized by five of the seven papers, which compares the difference in outcome variables 




Natality data from 1996 to 2009 to look at the DID effects of state mandates on birth 
rates as well as other measures of parental involvement, such as prenatal care and 
involvement in “risky” behaviors during pregnancy. Their regression models included 
county-level fixed effects. They found a statistically significant four percent decline in 
the birth rate for Hispanic women under 19 years old. Since only a third of Hispanic 
women were covered by the state mandates, the authors estimated a “treatment-on-the-
treated” effect of a 12 percent decline for this subpopulation. No other subpopulations 
had statistically significant effects. These upward-adjusted estimates may still be an 
underestimate, as the ACA contraceptive mandate also includes a zero copay for 
contraceptives not found in the state mandates on which Dills and Grecu based their 
model. 
Atkins and Bradford used BRFSS survey data between 1998 and 2010 in logit 
regression models to estimate the impact of state mandates on contraceptive use. They 
found that insured women in a state with a mandate were five percent more likely to use 
an “effective” method of contraception—which they defined as permanent sterilization, 
any FDA-approved prescription contraception, or condoms—and four percent more 
likely to use OCPs. Atkins and Bradford also found that there was no impact of the state 
mandates on women without insurance. As discussed earlier in Sections 2.2 and 2.4, self-
reported increases in contraceptive use may be inaccurate and do not necessarily imply a 
corresponding decrease in the fertility rate. However, since increased contraceptive use is 
necessary to reduce unintended pregnancies, all else equal, it is relevant to the likely 
outcome of our study’s hypothesis that the more limited state mandates had a positive 




Johnston and Adams used PRAMS data from 1997 to 2012 to estimate the 
probability of an unintended birth among privately insured women living in states with 
contraceptive mandates. The authors studied unintended birth as a whole, but also broke 
the unintended births into mistimed versus unwanted births. The authors found that the 
state mandates decreased the probability of unintended births overall and mistimed births 
specifically among women with private health insurance by 1.58 percent and 1.37 
percent, respectively, in the second year after implementation. There was not a 
statistically significant effect on the unintended subcategory of unwanted births, 
suggesting that women who categorically do not want pregnancy regardless of timing 
may be less sensitive to cost. Surprisingly, the authors also found that women without 
private health insurance had a 1.57 percent and 1.97 percent decreased probability of 
unintended births in the first and second years after implementation, respectively. 
However, this drop in unintended births was attributed mostly to a statistically significant 
1.21 percent decreased probability of an unwanted birth by the second year after 
implementation. In response to these results, the authors hypothesized that there could be 
spillover effects from the state mandates onto women without private health insurance. 
Other possible hypotheses include the fact that their models exclude variables that could 
account for differing economic and labor markets across states and time as well as 
abortion access, and, as discussed in Section 2.3, the possibility of bias when 
retrospectively self-reporting pregnancy intention post-birth.  
The paper by Gius used fixed effects regression to model the DID effect of state 
mandates on abortion, birth, and sexually-transmitted disease (STD) rates between 1996 




decrease in the crude fertility rate of 0.443 births per 1,000 women. Although Gius 
included variables for the percent of the state that is White/Caucasian as well as the 
percent falling in certain age categories, all the regressions were done on the US 
population as a whole and not by subpopulation. This is a major limitation of this paper 
since the unintended pregnancy rates described in Section 2.3 – and thus the expected 
impact of a contraceptive mandate – vary significantly by racial/ethnic and age 
subpopulation.  
The paper by Mulligan utilized fixed effects to estimate the DID impact of state 
mandates on abortion and birth rates and contraception use. Results showed a statistically 
significant impact on abortions, estimating a three percent decrease in the abortion rate. 
Mulligan used this figure to estimate that the ACA contraceptive mandate would avoid 
approximately 25,000 abortions in the first year of implementation in the 20 states 
without state mandates prior to the ACA. Mulligan also found a statistically significant 
2.1 percent increased likelihood of contraceptive use, but no significant impact on the 
birth rate. Unlike Gius, Mulligan was able to include three age categories—teens, 20-29, 
and 30-39—but like Gius also did not run any separate regressions by racial or ethnic 
subcategories. Although it seems reasonable to use the state mandates’ results to 
prospectively estimate the lower bounds of the possible impact of the ACA contraceptive 
mandate, the state mandates sufficiently differ from the ACA contraceptive mandate to 
suggest a need for retrospective analysis now that longitudinal data are available.  
Magnusson, et al. used NSFG data gathered between 2006 and 2008 in multilevel 
logistic regression models to estimate the adjusted odds ratio (aOR) of consistent 




contraceptive mandates. The authors found a statistically significant aOR of 1.64 (95% 
CI: 1.08-2.5) of consistent contraceptive use for women with private insurance in states 
with full mandates. As stated previously, self-reported contraceptive use has flaws and 
does not necessarily imply a decrease in unintended births. Additionally, this paper 
seemed to ignore the timing of when specific states’ mandates went into effect, which 
seems important since six of the 23 states’ mandates were enacted between 2005 and 
2007, just before or during the time period examined in this paper. 
Although quite different from the previous six studies described, Burlone, et al. is 
included because it utilized available data to conduct an economic evaluation. This study 
used a decision-analytic model and TreeAge software to model the impact of increased 
contraceptive coverage proposed under the ACA contraceptive mandate. The authors 
compared the then-current status of women in Oregon versus the predicted reality under 
the ACA contraceptive mandate. The authors found that the ACA mandate would save 
healthcare costs, decrease the fertility rate, and increase quality adjusted life years 
(QALYs) via avoiding unintended pregnancies. These results are not as broadly 
generalizable as the population in Oregon is not representative of the entire US 
population, and as a result this article is the most geographically limited of the category. 
However, this article helps to provide additional evidence of the expected effects of the 
ACA contraceptive mandate, even if the results are limited to a narrow subpopulation. 
The papers in this pre-ACA first category of research have substantial limitations, 
especially now that more data are available. That said, these papers still provide a helpful 




Among the research conducted post-ACA, no studies have examined the effect of 
the implementation of the ACA contraceptive mandate on fertility rates or abortion rates, 
instead examining the effects on other outcomes, such as price, LARC utilization, pill 
sales and discontinuation (Arora & Desai, 2015; Bearak & Jones, 2017; Bullinger & 
Simon, 2019; Carlin, Fertig, & Dowd, 2016; Law et al., 2016; Pace, Dusetzina, & 
Keating, 2016a; Pace, Dusetzina, & Keating, 2016b). However, because avoidance of 
unintended pregnancy constitutes the main cost savings of a contraceptive, and 
contraceptive sales and reported use do not equate to efficient prevention of unwanted 
pregnancy (especially as contraceptives can be used for things other than pregnancy 
prevention such as acne or period symptom management), it is still important to look at 
the ultimate impact of contraception mandates on fertility rates. Nine studies are included 
for further discussion. 
Two of the papers use a pre-post design, which is a relatively weaker method 
comparing two cross-sectional measurements before and after the policy change. Arora 
and Desai used NSFG data from 2011 to 2013 to estimate the impact of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate on utilization and costs of reproductive preventive health (2015). 
Although they included a variety of demographic variables in their models, they did not 
run regressions by subpopulation. They found that the proportion of women using 
contraceptives did not significantly change between 2011 and 2013. Bearak and Jones 
used survey data from 2012 and 2015 in two cross-sectional studies to determine the 
impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on contraceptive use (2017). Although they 
found no change in use among sexually active women, use of the pill increased from 21 




month. Even so, most of the women in this second category listed pregnancy prevention 
as one of the reasons for starting contraceptives, suggesting a potential impact on 
unintended pregnancy.  
Two papers had such narrow topics that the results only speak to one part of the 
effects of the ACA contraceptive mandate. Pace et al. (2016b) utilized claims data in a 
retrospective cohort study between 2010 and 2013 on the impact of the ACA on LARC 
use. They found that the percent of total pharmaceutical claims with zero copayment for 
IUDs and implants increased from 36.6 percent to 87.6 percent and from 9.3 percent to 
80.5 percent, respectively, between 2010 and 2013. Although Pace et al. also found an 
increase of LARC uptake over time, this increase was not statistically significant. Law et 
al. also used claims data from 2011 to 2013 to estimate the impact of the ACA on out-of-
pocket costs for contraceptives (2016). The authors found that costs decreased 70 percent, 
but did not find a statistically significant change in contraceptive use. Both these papers 
are not only limited by their narrow topics, they also did not account for the effect of state 
mandates on ACA effects. 
Pace, et al. (2016a) used prescription claims data for women with employer-
sponsored insurance between 2010 and 2013 to estimate the impact of the ACA on 
contraceptive cost sharing, discontinuation, and nonadherence. The authors utilized 
multivariate logistic regression and found a statistically significant decrease in cost 
sharing post-ACA. Higher cost-sharing was associated with higher discontinuation rates, 
and discontinuation and nonadherence had a significant but small decrease post-ACA. As 




when copayments are at or near zero—is that automatic shipment of zero-cost 
contraceptives does not imply continued or consistent use. 
Of the nine post-ACA studies included in this analysis, Canestaro, et al. is unique 
in that it provides a cost-effectiveness analysis of the ACA employer mandate to cover 
contraceptives (Canestaro, Vodicka, Downing, & Trussell, 2016). Specifically, this study 
utilized a decision model to estimate the cost-effectiveness of insurance companies 
electively choosing to cover contraception under employer-sponsored insurance. This 
paper was written as a response to the expanded exemptions for mandated insurance 
coverage of contraceptives. The study utilized parameters from NSFG survey data to 
estimate the age, marital status, sexual activity, and contraceptive method use of the 
women in the model. The authors found that providing no contraceptive coverage 
resulted in a statistically significant increase in the number of unintended pregnancies, 
unintended births, and abortions. Total costs to the insurance company were also higher 
when providing no contraceptive coverage. The greatest effect was found on women 
between 20 and 29 years old. Although this article implies that even the more restrictive 
ACA contraceptive mandate is cost-effective for the country as a whole, it is still crucial 
to have analysis done on the data containing the real-life effects of the ACA. However, 
this article only models the hypothetical impact based on survey data and fails to utilize 
real data from the time period when the ACA contraceptive mandate was in effect.  
Finally, three papers utilized DID methods to look at the effects of the ACA on 
reproductive health, with two papers looking at contraceptive use and the third looking at 
fertility rates. Carlin, et al. utilized claims data for women in the Midwest with employer-




women with insurance coverage that eliminated contraceptive copayments, and the 
control group included women with insurance coverage that still required some non-zero 
contraceptive copayment. The authors found that decreasing the copayment led to a 
statistically significant 2.3 percent increase in contraceptive use with an increased 
likelihood of using LARCs. This paper is not only limited in terms of geography and 
generalizability to the US, but also because contraceptive claims do not equate to 
contraceptive use or a reduction in unintended pregnancies. Trudeau and Conway used 
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and BRFSS to examine the impact of 
both the ACA contraceptive mandate and the ACA young adult-dependent coverage 
mandate on young adults between 18 and 26 years old (Trudeau & Conway, 2018). The 
authors found a small decrease in fertility due to the contraceptive mandate in only some 
models. Although this study combines two policies that very much affected young adult 
health concurrently in a compelling model, its conclusions even for this age subgroup are 
limited because this study does not run the models by demographic subpopulations. 
Finally, Bullinger and Simon used prescription claims data between 2008 and 2014 to 
compare the sales of specific contraceptive methods pre- and post-ACA in states that did 
versus did not have a state contraceptive mandate prior to the ACA (2019). The authors 
found that the ACA increased sales of prescription contraceptives generally and a 
statistically significant increase in injectable contraceptives, but found no impact on other 
forms of prescription contraceptives (e.g. IUD, implant, pill, etc.) in states that did not 
have a state contraceptive mandate relative to states that did have a mandate. The main 




contraceptive mandate was completely random and (2) that the effect of the state mandate 
is the same as the ACA contraceptive mandate.  
Although substantial research has been done on various aspects of state-specific 
contraceptive mandates as well as the ACA contraceptive mandate, present research has 
not yet definitively understood the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on fertility 
and abortion rates.  
2.9 Conceptual Framework 
The broader conceptual framework for this research question includes a 
discussion of how individuals and couples decide whether to use contraceptives at all 
and, if so, how and when to use contraceptives for both the spacing (the individual or 
couple wants another child, but not now) and limiting (the individual or couple does not 
want another child) of children. Because this analysis ultimately looks at the effects of 
contraceptive use in terms of changes in the fertility and abortion rates, it will be 
impossible to identify whether changes in these rates are occurring because of 
preferences for spacing or limiting. 
The conceptual framework for this research will examine three main components: 
1. The general contraceptive decision-making framework; 2. The demand and supply for 
contraceptives in general; and 3. The individual model of selecting a contraceptive 
method based on perceived effectiveness as well as cost to the individual. 
2.9.1 General Contraceptive Decision-Making Framework 
The below visual flowchart (Figure 17) shows the pathways of different variables 
that influence contraceptive decision-making and contraceptive use and is an adaptation 




are intertwined and influence how the other categories ultimately lead to contraceptive 
decisions: perceived threat of pregnancy, cues to action, contraceptive cost-benefit 
analysis, and modifying and enabling factors.   
 
The perceived threat of pregnancy includes factors that identify the perceived 
likelihood of getting pregnant and the magnitude of a pregnancy’s impact at that point in 
life. A woman may not have the knowledge to know what her risks of pregnancy are. 
Lack of sex education or awareness of one’s fertility may inaccurately lead some women 
to assume that their activities are not putting them at risk for pregnancy. The perceived 
threat would be affected by the ambivalence the woman felt toward pregnancy in her life 
in general and at the more specific time of the contraceptive decision. If a woman knew 
she likely wanted to have kids at some point, but maybe not right now, she may be less 





The cues to action may be internal or external and would operate to alert the 
woman to the threat of pregnancy. Internal cues could include menarche for very young 
women or delayed or missed periods in menstruating women. External cues could include 
anything absorbed from another person or entity, such as friends or the media, which 
would alert the woman to a risk of an unplanned pregnancy.  
The contraceptive cost-benefit analysis is discussed at greater length in Sections 
2.9.2 and 2.9.3, and weighs the perceived benefits of contraceptive use (such as increased 
likelihood of avoiding unplanned pregnancy) with the perceived costs. Costs are not 
limited to the financial costs, but also include social costs, time costs of obtaining 
contraceptives, and the risk of any side effects.  
Finally, the modifying and enabling factors influence the ways in which each 
woman interacts with the other categories of variables, including demographic, 
psychological, social, reproductive, and structural variables. A woman with higher 
socioeconomic status and more ready access to healthcare and transportation may have 
had more thorough sex education (increasing her perceived threat of pregnancy), had 
more exposure to contraceptive options from her physician in annual exams (increasing 
cues to action), and may have better health insurance coverage and more income to cover 
contraceptive costs (affecting the cost-benefit analysis).  
All four of these categories of variables work together to ultimately lead to a 
decision about contraceptive method use. This “decision” can even be the subconscious 
choice to delay by taking no action, for example, in the case where the perceived threat is 




the likelihood of using contraceptives in a way that can reduce the risk of unwanted 
pregnancy.  
From a policy perspective, addressing any of the first three categories of 
variables—perceived threat of pregnancy, cues to action, and cost-benefit analysis—
while being aware of the modifying and enabling factors that put certain subpopulations 
at greatest risk could offer potential policy avenues for decreasing unplanned pregnancy. 
Since the categories of variables are all intertwined, thought must be given about how 
intervention in one area affects the entire experience of the individual. 
2.9.2 General Economics of Contraceptives 
Economics as a science attempts to make sense of human behavior. In economics, 
the discussion of consumer behavior frequently starts with defining a utility function, or 
mathematical representation of the estimate of happiness or satisfaction that one derives 
from consuming different goods. A more detailed discussion on the development and 
structure of the utility function is available in Section 8.1.1.  
Economics assumes that people make utility-maximizing consumption decisions 
based on their utility functions, budget constraints, and prices in that moment. Any 
change in any of those three factors could affect purchase decisions. For example, a 
substantial increase in income could increase the total quantity of goods consumed. 
Likewise, evolving preferences could alter one’s utility function and shift consumption. 
The economics of consumer behavior focuses mainly, though, on the effects of 
price changes on quantities of goods purchased. The price elasticity of demand is the 
standard measure of the impact of a price change on the quantity purchased of a 




up, the expected quantity demanded (or purchased) decreases. Conversely, if the price 
goes down, the expected quantity demanded increases. This is illustrated in the following 
linearization of the demand equation: 
[Eq 1] 
Q =  β0 +  β1P 
where Q represents the quantity demanded, P represents the price, and 𝛽𝛽1 represents the 
impact on quantity purchased when the price increases (or decreases) by one unit. 
Frequently, 𝛽𝛽1 is negative because one would expect an inverse relationship between 
price and quantity demanded. When looking at the effect of a change in price on the 
change in quantity, the above formula eventually yields the following equation for the 
price elasticity of demand, ε, where: 
[Eq 2] 




If the demand curve is a linear function, then the elasticity will be dependent upon 
the starting prices and quantities because it utilizes the percent change. Thus, the 
elasticity will be higher at higher starting prices and will not be constant across the 
function. To account for this, it is common practice to take the natural log of the above 
demand equation so the estimated elasticity is constant across all prices and quantities, 
yielding the following equation: 
[Eq 3] 
lnQ =  β0 +  β1lnP 
A good is defined as having elastic demand if the elasticity is greater than one and 




has a greater than unit change in quantity (e.g. increasing the price by one percent will 
lead to a decrease in quantity that is greater than one percent). This frequently happens 
when there are substitutes for the specific good.  
Because there are many contraceptive methods available, one might expect that 
demand for a specific contraceptive could be relatively elastic. However, the costs 
associated with switching contraceptive methods could make the demand seem more 
inelastic. Previous estimates of the price elasticity of contraceptives have largely 
determined that it is inelastic (Janowitz & Bratt, 1996; Lewis, 1986). Further discussion 
of how this equation will be utilized in this research can be found in Section 4 below. 
In order for economic models to work exactly as predicted, it is assumed that the 
consumers have full information and are able to make rational, utility-maximizing 
decisions. These two assumptions possibly never reflect reality, but these two 
assumptions are especially unrealistic when it comes to contraceptive purchase decisions 
for the following reasons. 
As is the case with most goods, when comparing various contraceptive methods, 
the consumer must evaluate multiple variables, such as cost (including both monetary and 
time costs), quality (including perceived effectiveness and risk of side effects), and ease 
of use. This decision is further complicated with contraceptive purchases because all 
contraceptives are not used for the same time period. Some are used in a single act of 
sexual intercourse (e.g. male condoms) while others can be used for up to ten years (e.g. 
copper IUD). This complicates the purchase decision because women are faced with 





For example, in addition to having higher effectiveness than SARCs, choosing to 
purchase an IUD has major time benefits, both in the form of lower time costs associated 
with compliance (e.g. avoiding taking a pill each day or scheduling and attending regular 
appointments for injectables, etc.) and lower time costs associated with making 
contraceptive decisions in the future.  
The drawbacks of using an IUD, though, could include the uncertainty that a 
woman would have about whether that particular method will work for them specifically, 
whether she will want to continue using contraceptives during the lifespan of the IUD 
(versus wanting to try to have a/another child), and whether newer and potentially 
preferable methods would become available in the lifespan of the IUD. As is the case 
with most durable goods, historically there has been a relatively high upfront cost for an 
IUD, which adds financial risk to a complicated decision. 
Another important component to the contraceptive method decision is the 
availability and accuracy of information about contraceptive alternatives. This includes 
information about pricing, side-effects, and effectiveness and could come from many 
sources, including physicians, pharmaceutical companies via advertising, partners, peers, 
or community resources. Since economics often assumes perfect information, it is 
important to note that the absence of perfect information in this case, particularly 
information about effectiveness and relative prices, could lead to unexpected purchase 
decisions. 
For these reasons, it is unclear how much price alone will impact contraceptive 
use in the US, because the prices will change in an ever-changing world of availability, 




assumptions will affect the results and could lead to different effects across time. For 
example, common beliefs about IUD safety for nulliparous women has been changing 
slowly over the last decade (Luchowski et al., 2014), so the likelihood of a physician 
suggesting use of an IUD in nulliparous women would likely increase with time, and, 
thus, likely increase IUD use among this population (Fleming, Sokoloff, & Raine, 2010) 
independent of IUD pricing.  
This study will not attempt to attribute portions of changes in fertility or abortion 
rates to either changes in pricing, information, or common practices. However, it is 
imperative that these other forces are acknowledged and kept in mind when interpreting 
results. 
To more closely examine the impact of these and other variables on contraceptive 
purchase decisions, the model of the decision at the individual level will now be 
explored. 
2.9.3 Individual Model for Contraceptive Decision Making 
When an individual is deciding whether to prevent a pregnancy, they are 
essentially weighing the total costs versus the total benefits of having a pregnancy. The 
total benefits of having a pregnancy when a child is wanted are high and somewhat 
difficult to quantify, including evolutionary-driven delight at seeing one’s offspring, the 
desire to raise a child with a partner, social approval, and the increased chance of 
companionship and caregiving later in life. Since this research question assumes that the 
total benefits of pregnancy are less than the total costs at least at the point in time when 
the woman chooses to use contraceptives, quantifying the benefits of having a child will 




The expected total costs (TC) of having an unplanned pregnancy are more easily 
defined, since most of the costs are either already defined explicitly in dollar amounts or 
easily quantified, and are divided into three categories: lost wages, costs of childrearing, 
and the additional less tangible costs associated with the burden of having an unplanned 
pregnancy. The lost wages (LW) due to an unplanned birth are not limited to just 
pregnancy and postpartum recovery. Lost wages are a discounted sum of reduced 
earnings into the future as shown below: 
[Eq 4] 




where β is a discount rate between 0 and 1, 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 represent the 
wages and labor supply at time t of the woman if she had no pregnancies, and 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 
and 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 represent the wages and labor supply post-pregnancy at time t. 
The loss of wages could extend well beyond the postpartum recovery in some situations 
where women delay returning to work or work fewer hours for many years after the birth 
of a child. Although relatively smaller in magnitude, there could also be LW when 
choosing abortion after an unplanned pregnancy if unpaid time off work was needed for 
the abortion procedure or recovery. 
Total childrearing expenses are defined as the additional monetary costs of caring 
for a baby (CB). Overall basic living costs—including housing, medical care, food, 
clothing, and childcare—are higher for women who choose childbirth. Some of the costs 
are likely to be shared with the child’s father if the woman is married or can establish the 




difference in these basic living costs for the woman with and without a child. This sum 
would be added across the entire woman’s life and the sign of CB may change in later 
years due to remittances. CB is defined as the following: 
[Eq 5] 




where β is again a discount rate between zero and one, the subscripts “pp,t” and “t” refer 
to time t post-pregnancy and time t without a pregnancy, respectively, H represents 
housing costs, M represents medical care costs, F represents food costs, C represents 
clothing costs, and CC represents childcare costs, which is only positive when the woman 
has a child. 
The third category includes the less tangible costs of the additional disutility of 
having an unwanted baby (DB), which could include emotional distress, cultural stigma, 
or negative impacts on family or other relationships. When a child is unwanted, it would 
be expected that this last category of costs would have considerable variability across 
women, and could be particularly high in some situations. Finally, for women who abort, 
there are the costs of the abortion procedure, lost wages due to time off for the procedure 
and recovery, and any additional emotional disutility from having an abortion, 
represented in the model as a single “Abortion Cost” for simplicity. These components 
yield an equation for the expected total costs of getting pregnant at time i to be: 
[Eq 6] 




The expected cost, then, of an unplanned pregnancy in a one year time period 
would be TCi multiplied by the probability of pregnancy (PRP) in that same time period. 
When using no contraceptive method, the typical woman faces an 85 percent chance of 
pregnancy in one year. If using the Mirena IUD, the typical woman faces a 0.2 percent 
chance of pregnancy in the same time period (Trussell, 2001). Thus, if a woman 
recognizes that she would have high total costs of an unplanned pregnancy, she should 
also recognize that her expected costs—meaning what her costs should be if she were the 
average woman—would be highly dependent upon the efficacy and effectiveness of the 
contraceptive method used, if any.  
Assuming that women want to minimize the net cost of avoiding unintended 
pregnancy, their goal is to minimize the following:   
[Eq 7] 
Minimize Net Cost =   Cij +  TCi  ×  PRPij 
where Cij represents the discounted cost in period i of contraceptive j, TCi represents the 
discounted total costs of the unplanned pregnancy in period i, and PRPij  represents the 
probability of a pregnancy with contraceptive method j in period i5. Although PRPij  is 
typically reported in terms of the probability of pregnancy in a year with contraceptive 
                                                 
5 There are many factors aside from contraceptive use that affect PRP. In his seminal paper, 
Bongaarts identified the proximate determinants of fertility through which SES and environmental 
variables impact the fertility rate on a population level. Some of the proximate determinants Bongaarts 
discussed include: involuntary sterility, fecundity, breastfeeding, mean age at marriage, and contraception 
use and effectiveness. The individual model developed in Section 2.9.3 ignores the factors beyond 
contraceptive use and effectiveness in order to simplify the model. Additionally, the data used in this 
analysis are state-level data based on millions of women. With this many women represented in the data, 
individual proximate determinants average out to constants and the ACA contraceptive mandate's effect on 
Cij can be considered ceteris paribus in the sample. Finally, the statistical methods used assume that 
nothing happens concurrent with the ACA contraceptive mandate that would impact the proximate 
determinants of fertility as a population level, such as sudden changes in breastfeeding norms or 




method j, PRPij can be calibrated to any time horizon. For example, a woman wanting to 
make her contraceptive method decision each month would calibrate the annual PRPij into 
the monthly risk of pregnancy with method j. Alternately, a woman who knew that she 
wanted to delay childbearing for a minimum of five years could calibrate the annual 
PRPij into a five-year measure to more accurately model the long-term costs of LARCs. If 
PRPij were calibrated to any time period i other than one year, Cij would also need to be 
adjusted to the total discounted costs of method j over the selected time period. 
If, for example, a woman was comparing using the lowest price modern 
contraceptive method to using no method, she would apply the following inequality. 
[Eq 8] 
CLowest Price Contraceptioni ≤  TCi  × (PRPNone  −  PRPAny)𝑖𝑖 
which shows that a woman’s utility will be greater using any contraceptive method as 
long as CLowest Price Contraceptioni  is less than or equal to the difference in expected costs 
of the unplanned pregnancy when using no method versus any method. 
This same evaluation could theoretically be done to compare any two 
contraceptive methods. Table 1 lists the PRP, one-year effectiveness, retail costs, 
expected lifetime cost of childbearing (PRP*lifetime cost of childbearing), and 
Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratios (ICER) for seven different contraceptive choices. 
If a person did not want to ever have another pregnancy, each year they should be willing 
to pay some amount for contraceptives up to the total cost of raising a child multiplied by 
their risk of having an unintended pregnancy in that year, calculated in Table 1 as 
PRP*Lifetime Cost of Childbearing. If the increase in retail cost from switching to a 




of childbearing, then switching to that contraceptive method is considered cost effective. 
Applying this definition, each contraceptive method listed in Table 1 is cost-effective. 
ICERs measure the change in cost divided by the change in estimated effect when 
switching between possible interventions. Specifically in this case, the ICER measures 
the dollars paid per percent increase in one-year effectiveness resulting from switching to 
a more effective contraceptive method. As is seen in Table 1, the lowest ICER is for the 
switch from unprotected sex to a male condom, which decreases the expected costs of 
raising an unwanted child by $156,519 when spending $120 per year on condoms, 
yielding an ICER of 1.79, or spending $1.79 for each additional percent of one-year 
effectiveness. If switching from male condoms to an oral contraceptive, one would pay 
an additional $554 to decrease the expected cost of raising an unwanted child by an 
additional $21,025. Although it still is rational to spend the additional $554 to save 
$21,025 in expected costs, it is a relatively less cost-effective switch than switching from 
nothing to condoms.  
With the high US unintended pregnancy rate, the greatest impact that the ACA 
could have on unintended pregnancy (and, thus, on fertility and abortion rates), would be 
from switching women from no contraceptive to any contraceptive method or from 
reducing discontinuation or brand switching among methods. Although there would be a 
lower unintended pregnancy rate if everyone who currently was using oral contraceptives 
switched to an IUD, the additional costs would be much more effectively spent by getting 
more women on any contraceptive. A recent study found that reducing unintended 
pregnancies is most effectively achieved by decreasing method failure rather than 




2014). Although it is interesting to know whether zero cost contraceptives shift prior 
users of oral contraceptives to IUDs, it has less aggregate importance related to the 
unintended pregnancy rate. Thus, the focus of this analysis is on how the ACA 
contraceptive mandate impacts fertility rate rather than how it optimizes contraceptive 
method mix.  
 
The rational choice model predicts that women’s demand for contraception should 
not be very price sensitive because the gains to contraceptive use (in the form of 
decreasing the expected cost of raising a child) far exceed the full contraceptive costs 
even if the products are not insured (see Table 1). Indeed, the rational model predicts that 
unintended pregnancy would be a rare event in a highly-rational population with high 
awareness about the availability of contraception and super-human impulse control. 
What’s more, it seems especially surprising that the unintended pregnancy rate is so high 
in the US because only 12 percent of private-sector employees in the US have paid 








Perfect Abstinence 0% 0% $0 $0
Unprotected Sex 85% 15% $0 $198,569 -        
Male Condom4 18% 82% $120 $42,050 1.79      
Oral Contraceptive Pill 9% 91% $674 $21,025 61.59    
Injectable 6% 94% $551 $14,017 (41.14)   
Mirena IUD 0.2% 99.8% $850 $467 51.53    
Implanon 0.05% 99.95% $961 $117 738.40  
Notes and Sources:
[1] Source: Trussell J. Contraceptive Efficacy. In Hatcher RA, Trussell J, Nelson AL, Cates W, Kowal D, Policar M. 
Contraceptive Technology: Twentieth Revised Edition.  New York, NY: Ardent Media, 2011.
[3] Estimated lifetime cost was set at $233,610, per Lino, M., Kuczynski, K., Rodriguez, N., Schap, T. (2017). 
Expenditures on Children by Families, 2015.  Miscellaneous Publication No. 1528-2015. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion. Available at: https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/crc2015_March2017.pdf
[2] Source for all methods except male condoms: Trussell, J., Lalla, A. M., Doan, Q. V., Reyes, E., Pinto, L., & Gricar, 
J. (2009). Cost effectiveness of contraceptives in the United States. Contraception, 79(1), 5–14. 





family leave (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012), so the expected lost income6 during a 
brief maternity leave alone would far outweigh the cost of even many IUD insertions and 
removals each year.  
Obviously, reality is right and the model is wrong—the goal of this exercise in 
theorizing is to establish the details about why the rational choice model fails. Ultimately, 
the theory that price matters in contraceptive decision-making presumes 100% rational 
calculation whereas real people have bounded rationality due to imperfect information 
and non-rational motivations rooted in feelings, social status, identity formation. Some 
coital acts occur after executive function has been impaired by alcohol or other 
substances. The nature of the violations to the rational choice model may or may not 
make a focus on price-barriers the obvious policy solution to unintended pregnancy.  
Other explanations for model failure might include imperfect information about 
prices and an individual’s specific PRP. For example, a recent study found that 49 
percent of women ages 15 to 24 who reported an unintended birth in a 2002 NSFG 
survey reported that they had not been using contraceptives because they did not believe 
that they could get pregnant, thus making contraceptives unnecessary (Chandra, et al., 
2012). Polis and Zabin found that although 19 percent of women and 13 percent of men 
believed it likely that they were infertile, some demographics had relatively higher odds 
of perceived infertility, including Hispanic women and men and women who received 
public assistance in the prior twelve months (2012). Furthermore, health insurance 
complicates the information about prices and both women and their physicians may not 
know what the prices of various methods will be. Additionally, although there is good 
                                                 




information about efficacy and decent information about effectiveness, the information 
about the effectiveness of a specific method for a specific individual is less known.  
For example, a woman may perceive that she would be an ideal patient and 
assume that she would adhere perfectly to the method’s protocol, and, thus, assume that 
her probability of pregnancy using any method would be much closer to the perfect-use 
rate (efficacy) rather than the typical-use rate (effectiveness). This potentially false 
assumption could negatively impact her ability to optimize contraceptive method choice. 
There is a chance that a highly-capable perfectionist with a deflated view of her 
capabilities may choose a method that is more effective than is warranted from an 
economic standpoint. For example, switching from an IUD to an implant shows a hugely 
inefficient ICER in Table 1. However, if the goal is to avoid unplanned pregnancies, then 
there should be less concern about these types of individuals and more concern about the 
confident and optimistic yet highly undisciplined women who would more likely 
overestimate their ability to strictly adhere to method protocol. 
Finally, one other aspect of human behavior—risk homeostasis—could be 
impacting how representative the rational model is of reality. It could be that women, on 
average, are very tolerant of their pre-ACA contraceptive mandate level of unintended 
pregnancy risk. Thus, with the increase in contraception (and decreased overall risk of 
pregnancy, all else equal), the theory of risk homeostasis argues that people would alter 
their behavior when switching to more effective methods of contraception to maintain 
their risk level. In the case of fertility and increased contraceptive use, the altered 
behavior would be increasing coital frequency (Bell & Bishai, 2017). If this theory 




zero effect on fertility. Since legal coitus is a voluntary act, more legal coitus increases 
the population well-being. Thus, even if the ACA contraceptive mandate does not change 
the overall fertility rates, the increased contraceptive prevalence indicate higher social 





3.0 Study Design 
This is a retrospective longitudinal data analysis of US fertility rates from 2007 to 
2017 and US abortion rates from 2008 to 2016. The time periods were selected due to 
data constraints and to ensure adequate capture of pre- and post-ACA contraceptive 
mandate trends in fertility and abortion rates. 
3.1 Study Population 
This research includes all women who at any point between 2007 and 2017 (Aim 
1) or 2008 and 2016 (Aim 2) were of reproductive age (defined as ages 15 to 44 for Aim 
1 and 11 to 44 for Aim 2) and lived in the United States. The study is based on vital 
records data for all births occurring inside the US regardless of mother’s citizenship. 
Although residents of all states are eligible to be included in this study, not all states 
report abortion data to the CDC each year, so some abortions will not be captured in this 
analysis. 
3.2 Data Sources 
3.21 Fertility Data 
The CDC Natality Data, which were accessed via CDC Wonder, were used for 
Aim 1. These data include counts of all live births in the US. This analysis is limited to 
2007 through 2017 because of data availability at the time of the analysis. Although other 
data sources for live births had data available through 2018, they did not have the same 
breakdown of live birth counts or fertility rates by age of the mother, state, and race or 




subcategories, preference was given for greater data specificity over additional years of 
longitudinal data pre-ACA contraceptive mandate implementation.  
3.22 Abortion Data 
The primary data for Aim 2 come from the annual Abortion Surveillance reports 
published by the CDC for the years between 2008 and 2016. There is roughly a three-
year lag in data availability, so the data used reflect the most recent data available. These 
data include the counts of all reported legal abortions by the age of the woman, state, and 
race or ethnicity. There are 47 “reporting areas” included in the Abortion Surveillance 
reports for the study period, which include 46 states and DC.  
There are a couple limitations to these data. First, four states—California, Florida, 
Maryland, and New Hampshire—do not ever report abortion data during the study period 
and not all states report each year, so some abortion data are not captured. Second, not all 
the abortion data that are reported include all of the demographic information to further 
categorize the counts, such as age of the mother. Finally, the data that are further broken 
down by demographic categories are reported by the state where the abortion occurred 
instead of by the woman’s state of residence.  
The final limitation is the most problematic for this analysis. Ideally, data by the 
state of residence would be strongly preferred because a person’s circumstances that 
result in abortion happen in the state where they live, not the state where the abortion 
takes place. It is the state-level mandate and the state-level variables that most impact the 
effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate in the state. States neighboring other states with 
relatively restrictive abortion laws will have data for a large number of abortions that 




restrictive abortion laws will not record the full abortion outcome for their policies, 
culture, and demographics. The most recent Abortion Surveillance Report published by 
the CDC states that 12.4 percent of all abortions reported to the CDC do not include 
information about maternal residence. Furthermore, there is substantial variation in the 
percent of abortions obtained by out-of-state residents in each state—ranging from 0.6 
percent in Alaska to 49.8 percent in Kansas. These limitations and the methods used to 
mitigate them are discussed in greater detail in Sections 4.2 and 5.1. 
Additionally, data on the number of operating abortion facilities by state and year 
were provided by The Guttmacher Institute. For the three years in the 2008 to 2016 time 
period for which these data were not available—2009, 2012, and 2015—the mean of the 
number of facilities in the state from the year before and after the missing year was used. 
These data were used as a proxy for overall abortion access within states during the study 
period. 
3.23 Census Data 
Total resident counts by state, age of the woman, and race or ethnicity were 
obtained from US Census data. These counts were used for the population weights in the 
weighted regressions and to calculate the age-specific abortion rates by demographic 
subcategory. These data came from intercensal population estimates from 2007 through 
2017 and were accessed via the US Census Population Estimates API.  
The American FactFinder tool from the US Census was utilized to obtain 
intercensal estimates of state-level demographic variables. These data were used as 




3.3 Study Variables 
3.3.1 Outcome Variables 
The outcome variables are either the fertility rate for Aim 1 or the abortion rate 
for Aim 2, meaning the number of live births or abortions per 1,000 women in the 
designated aggregation level. For example, the most basic regressions will have the 
fertility rate or abortion rate by state and year, which can be interpreted as the number of 
live births or abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age in each state in each year. 
Regressions that are broken down by age categories will include age-specific fertility 
rates (ASFR) and age-specific abortion rates (ASAR). 
3.3.2 Binary Variables 
Each analytical file will include three binary or dummy variables. The first 
indicates whether the ACA contraceptive mandate is in effect (2013+). The second 
indicates whether a state mandate was in effect that year, which varies for each of the 30 
states. The final dummy variable is a multiplied product (or “interaction term”) of the 
previous two (and equals 1 if it is a year post-ACA contraceptive mandate in a state with 
a pre-ACA mandate). The final effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate in states with 
state-specific mandates would be the sum of the estimated coefficients for the first and 
third binary variables.  
Unlike policies that have a clear start date of impact, such as speed limit laws, the 
contraceptive mandate had a more staggered starting impact on individuals since it was 
implemented via insurance coverage, with different policies adopting the change at 




implementation and effects were used in the series of regressions. A more detailed 
discussion of these assumptions about effect coding is included in Section 4.2.4. 
3.3.3 Demographic Variables 
Ten demographic variables aggregated at the state-year level are included in the 
model. These variables are utilized because they are likely to be associated with the 
fertility and abortion rates in each state and help explain differences between states in the 
outcome variables. The demographic variables fall into three categories described below 
in Table 2. An additional demographic variable measuring the annual ratio of open 
abortion clinics per 100,000 women between ages 15 and 44 was used in the abortion 
analyses. Because demographic data were not consistently available by demographic 
subgroup, the state means for the demographic variables were used as proxies for the 
subgroups’ true demographic variable values. Investigation of data that were available by 
subgroup showed variation in subgroups’ correlation with the state means (see Appendix 






Table 2: Demographic Variable Definitions
Category Variable Definition
Insurance Data Employer-based health 
insurance
Percent of the state population ages 18 to 64 
years with employer-based health insurance
Medicaid coverage* Percent of the state population ages 18 to 64 
years with Medicaid coverage
Household Data Household income State median household income
Family size State mean family size
Population Data Unemployment rate State unemployment rate
Percent Non-Hispanic 
White
Percent of all state population that is Non-
Hispanic White/Caucasian
Percent married Percent of women ages 15 and older who are 
currently married
Percent born to unwed 
mothers
Percent of all babies born each year to 
unmarried mothers
High school graduate Percent of the state population ages 25 and over 
with a high school degree or higher
College graduate Percent of the state population ages 25 and over 
with a bachelor's degree or higher






4.1 Data Processing 
The data described in Section 3.2 were downloaded from publicly available 
websites or extracted from published publicly available reports. Analytical files were 
created for each outcome (fertility rates and abortion rates) and for each level of 
aggregation. There was a total of six analytical files for Aim 1 and four for Aim 2, 
described in Table 2 below. The analytical files do not have identical aggregation levels 
because the abortion data were more limited than the fertility data.  
The first analytical file for abortion rates is categorized by the woman’s state of 
residence. The remaining three analytical files for the abortion rate are categorized by the 
state of abortion occurrence. It would have been preferred to have data by the state of 
residence to better control for state-level factors influencing the abortion rate. Since state 
data are not available by age category or race/ethnicity, the first two analytical files—
both with all ages and all races/ethnicities—are used to better understand the difference 





Once these ten files were created, the three binary variables described in Section 
3.3.2 were merged onto each dataset by state and year. The data for the ten demographic 
variables described in Section 3.3.3 were combined into a single file by state and year 
and similarly merged onto each analytical dataset. Finally, the population weights were 
calculated. The population weights were defined as the mean population across the entire 
time period for that aggregation level. For example, the mean annual number of 
Black/African American women between ages 20 and 24 living in Nebraska between 
2007 and 2017 would be used to form the population weight utilized in the fifth 
analytical file for the Aim 1 fertility rate analysis.  
Table 4 below reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this 
analysis. Summary statistics were calculated from the data utilized in the regression 
models with demographic variables and all demographic subpopulations combined. Each 
variable represents the state-wide value; there are no breakdowns by demographic 
Table 3: Analytical Files Created
Outcome Age Race Ethnicity
Regression 
Models†
Fertility Rate All All All 2
All By race All 4
All All By ethnicity 2
By age category All All 6
By age category By race All 24
By age category All By ethnicity 12
Abortion Rate* All All All 2
All All All 2
By age category All All 6
All By race By ethnicity 4
*The first set of abortion regressions for all populations combined is for abortions by the woman's state 
of residence. The remaining three sets of regressions are for abortions by the state of occurrence.
†The analytical files for all ages and all races/ethnicities have two regressions per file: one with only the 




subcategory in this table. The reported mean represents the unweighted average of each 
variable for the listed number of state-years. Four states—California, Florida, Maryland, 
and New Hampshire—do not report abortion data. Additionally, the abortion data are not 
available for as many years. Thus, there are fewer states and state-years in the abortion 
analysis. Other than having a slightly lower average median household income in the 
abortion analysis, the demographic variable means and standard deviations are largely 
unchanged.  
 




Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Crude Fertility Rate (births per 1,000 women) 63.23 6.75 - -
Abortion Rate (abortions per 1,000 women) - - 10.10 3.89
Unemployment Rate 7.7% 1.9% 7.9% 1.9%
Median Household Income $54,325 $9,119 $52,961 $8,393
Percent with Medicaid 12.4% 4.7% 12.1% 4.6%
Percent Married 50.2% 4.3% 50.5% 4.1%
Median Family Size 3.18 0.17 3.17 0.16
Percent with High School Degree 87.8% 3.2% 87.6% 3.2%
Percent with College Degree 28.9% 6.0% 28.3% 5.6%
Percent with Employer-Based Health Insurance 61.7% 5.3% 61.6% 5.0%
Percent Non-Hispanic White 69.5% 16.4% 70.7% 15.6%
Percent of Infants Born to Unwed Mothers 35.3% 6.8% 35.5% 6.8%
Abortion Clinics per 100,000 Women - - 1.26 0.99
Fertility Analysis Abortion Analysis
*The fertility analysis includes all 50 states plus DC. The abortion analysis includes 47 "reporting 
areas," with data representing 46 states (California, Florida, Maryland, and New Hampshire 
omitted) plus DC.
Note: Results are based off data utilized in regressions that include demographic variables and all 




4.1.1 Demographic Variable Exploratory Analysis 
As part of the data processing, an exploratory analysis of the demographic 
variables was conducted to better understand these variables and their relationship to the 
two outcomes—fertility and abortion rates. Boxplots were created first for each 
demographic variable to identify any outliers and confirm outlier data accuracy in source 
materials. Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing (LOWESS) was then run for the 
demographic variables with each of the two outcomes to observe the relationships 
between variables.  
4.2 Regression Model Methodology 
The final regression model was determined through strategic and systematic 
testing of six regression model characteristics. The order in which these analyses were 
conducted is outlined in Figure 18 and the following subsections walk through the 





4.2.1 Fixed Effects versus Random Effects 
The analytical datasets created as described in Section 4.1 were first used to run 
fixed effects regressions with the following regression equation: 
[Eq 9] 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑋𝑋′𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋 + 𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿′𝛿𝛿 + 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠 +  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 
where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 represents the fertility rate (or abortion rate) in state s at time t, 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 represents the dummy variable for state policy mandate, 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 represents the 
dummy variable for ACA, 𝑋𝑋′𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 represents a matrix of state-level demographic variables, 
𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿′ represents a matrix of dummy variables for each year, and 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠 and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡  represent the 




ACA contraceptive mandate (𝛽𝛽2) will be larger in magnitude and have a greater 
statistical significance than the coefficient estimating the impact of the state contraceptive 
mandates (𝛽𝛽1). The third coefficient (the “interaction term,” or 𝛽𝛽3) is expected to be the 
smallest in magnitude because women in states with state contraceptive mandates would 
experience relatively smaller additional benefits from the ACA contraceptive mandate 
than women in states without state contraceptive mandates. 
The decision between fixed effects and random effects models comes into play 
because of the potential for what is referred to as “omitted variable bias” in panel data. In 
most regressions, there are variables that are correlated with the outcome variable that are 
not included in the model. Typically, this happens because the variables are difficult to 
measure or are not available at the level of specificity required to be useful.  
For example, an individual’s decision about their own fertility or abortion use is 
likely influenced by their perceived level of community support or disapproval over their 
potential choices. The perceived support or disapproval could be influenced by religious 
or cultural differences. Perceived support or disapproval, religious or political views, and 
cultural differences vary regionally. Although these data could be carefully collected 
through well-articulated surveys and aggregated up to mean perceptions at the state level, 
that is infeasible for this analysis. However, because these mean perceptions and mean 
religious or cultural views and expectations are correlated with states, a random effects 
model may yield biased estimates of regression coefficients due to absorbing some of the 
effect of the omitted variables. 
The actual impact of the omitted variables on the outcome is irrelevant as fixed 




remove or control for the effect of the omitted variables that remain constant over time, 
or at least that can be assumed to remain constant over the time period of the analysis. 
For example, the cultural views toward fertility and abortion have certainly evolved over 
the last 100 years in the United States, but the changes within each state have been more 
constant over the time period in this analysis. When using fixed effects, the changes in 
the outcome variable are more likely to be accurately attributed to the changes in the 
observed predictors.  
Using fixed effects models is not without its drawbacks. Fixed effects models 
only utilize the variation within the entities—in this case, the states—and ignores the 
variation across states. Fixed effects models also cannot estimate the effects of variables 
that do not change over time. Additionally, by assuming omitted variables are time-
invariant, fixed effects models cannot estimate the impact of these omitted variables, but 
specification tests can detect whether collectively, the omitted variables were biasing 
estimates that did control for fixed effects. Finally, although fixed effects models yield 
less biased estimates, this comes at the cost of larger standard errors and the potential for 
type 2 error if sample sizes are limited. 
Given our theory of how local culture affects outcome variables, it seems likely 
that the fixed effects model would be preferred over random effects. However, to ensure 
that this is a correct assumption, a Hausman Test was conducted to verify the fixed 
effects versus random effects model. 
4.2.2 State Fixed Effects versus State-Specific Time Trends 
The fixed effects model at the state-year level is estimating a difference in 




the individual state y-intercepts for fertility rate and abortion rate trend lines would vary, 
this model assumes that each state will have parallel time trend in fertility rates across 
time. If this is a valid assumption, then the fixed effects model at the state-year level is 
sufficient. If, however, the trend lines are divergent across states, then it is more 
appropriate to also include state-specific time trends into the model to allow the 
flexibility for each state to have a different time trend. The decision about whether to 
include state-specific time trends involves balancing out the tradeoff between increasing 
the model’s accuracy and attenuating the statistical power of the model. There are 
relatively few observations when utilizing state-level data, so adding in state-specific 
trend lines for all 50 states can quickly weaken the model’s power. One avenue for 
compromise is to include state-specific trend lines only for states that appear to not have 
a roughly parallel time trend to the mean time trend for all states. 
To determine which states warrant the inclusion of state-specific trend lines, a 
visual inspection was done of all states’ trend lines compared to the mean time trend of 
all states. Any states identified as not having a roughly parallel time trend would be 
added to the regression model as a state-specific time trend. Models that were run with 
state fixed effects were compared with models run with both state fixed effects plus state-
specific time trends for states with non-parallel trends. Differences in the adjusted R-
squared statistics between the two modeling options were investigated to help determine 
whether adding state-specific time trends leads to a better model fit. Ratios of the 
estimated parameters of interest were graphed to understand how robust the results are to 




4.2.3 Population Weights 
Because there are arguments for and against using population weights in the 
regression models, all regressions are run with and without population weights. When 
using fixed effects, each state is treated as an individual unit, so this analysis has a 
maximum of 51 analytical units (50 states plus DC) in the fertility analysis and 47 
analytical units (46 states plus DC) in the abortion analysis. If the regression is not 
population-weighted, each of the 51 analytical units is treated as equally important 
compared to every other state in the regression, regardless of the relative population of 
each state. These unweighted regressions have results that are generalizable to states. 
Unweighted estimates presume that each state is the unit that is being given a policy 
treatment and that each state’s response to the treatment is of equal interest regardless of 
its population. Conveniently for a state policy maker, unweighted estimates are the mean 
effect on state-level fertility and abortion rates with the implementation of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate. 
If, however, the goal is to understand what happened on a population level or for 
any external applications, population weights are preferred as unweighted regression 
estimates may be biased. From our theoretical perspective, the ACA mandates and state 
policies were policy treatments applied to 60 million American women who happened to 
be residing in 51 different locations. When population weights are used, each birth or 
abortion has equal importance in the regression regardless of the state where the event 
occurred. This necessarily means that states with larger populations, such as California 
and New York, would have their fertility or abortion rates weighted more heavily in the 




wants to understand how an entire country’s population will respond to any future 
policies, then states with more people have to be weighted more. The estimates from the 
population-weighted models estimate the response to the policy on a population level. 
However, one must be cautious when interpreting and applying results from a 
population-weighted regression. The linear model assumes that there are homogenous 
error terms across the data points. Because states with a larger population have a larger 
sample size, their estimates of statewide fertility and abortion rates could have a smaller 
standard error than states with a smaller population and smaller sample size. Thus, if the 
assumption of homogenous error terms is violated and the states with higher populations 
are weighted more heavily in the model, the estimated coefficients could have estimated 
error terms that would be underestimated when applying results to smaller states. Adding 
the vce(robust) command in Stata helps to correct the heteroscedasticity of the error 
terms. 
To test the impact of utilizing population weights, the ten most populous states 
were iteratively removed from the model that utilized population weights. This was done 
to understand how excluding the most populous states impacted the significance and 
magnitude of the parameter of interest. Understanding each large state’s potential impact 
on the outcome provides guidance on when and how to use models with versus without 
population weights. 
4.2.4 Effect Coding  
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, a contraceptive mandate behaves differently than 
how we might normally think about laws. When they go into effect, most laws pose a 




into effect. In contrast, the contraceptive mandate required insurance companies to 
change their policies to cover prescription contraceptives starting after August 1, 2012. 
Although most private health insurance policies in the US start on January 1 of each year, 
because health insurance is often secured via employment, most people who started new 
health insurance coverage after August 1, 2012 would have a policy that would have to 
comply with the contraceptive mandate. This led to some people having full coverage of 
prescription contraceptives months before most people’s new health insurance policies 
started on January 1, 2013. 
Even if the health insurance coverage of everyone in the US changed on the same 
day, the effect of the policy still would not be on the same day for everyone because 
people need to see a physician to get prescriptions for contraceptives. Observable 
changes in births would then occur nine months later. This delay in the time to get an 
appointment and fill prescriptions and then get pregnant and then give birth leads to even 
greater differences in the date when the contraceptive mandate would begin having 
effects on fertility and abortion rates. 
Because of these two effects, using a strict binary categorization would lead to 
biased estimated effects of the contraceptive mandates, and would underestimate the true 
impact of the policy change. Even if data were available for each individual’s insurance 
coverage’s adoption of the contraceptive mandate, the regression’s calculated coefficient 
would still underestimate the impact of the policy change because of the delay from the 
date of policy change to the date that new contraceptives are acquired and being used. 
Effect coding is a strategy used when weights other than a binary zero or one 




to utilize effect coding to help account for the phase-in aspect of the mandate’s effects. 
This analysis uses effect coding in slightly different ways for the fertility and abortion 
analyses because a contraceptive mandate would impact each outcome on a different 
timeline. One would expect the earliest impact on fertility rates to be roughly nine 
months from the start of the contraceptive mandate, whereas the impact on abortions 
could start much sooner. Because of this difference, a “transition year” was defined to be 
the year in which it would be expected that the mandate would start impacting the 
specific outcome. Years after the transition year are modeled to have the full effect of the 
contraceptive mandate. 
Four different methods of effect coding were utilized in the series of regressions 
to test for impact for the both the fertility and abortion analyses. Details of each are listed 
below in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Comparisons of the magnitude and statistical significance of 







Table 5.1: Effect Coding Methods for Fertility Analyses
Method Label 2013 2014 Method Description
2013=0.35 0.35 1 The value of 0.35 was used because only the final three months 
of births in 2013 would be a result of pregnancies after the full 
mandate was in effect on 1/1/2013. The additional 0.1 is to cover 
the much smaller percent of people for whom the ACA mandate 
applied to their insurance plans starting in mid-2012. The 0.1 is 
likely larger than is needed, but that is done intentionally so the 
estimated effect is more likely to be underestimated than 
overestimated.
2013=0.5 0.5 1 This is more of a standard effect code when implementing mid-
year. This would likely overattribute birth rate changes to the 
ACA.
2013=1 1 1 This assumes that the full effect is seen starting as soon as the 
day the policy is in "full force." This unrealistically assumes that 
greater contraceptive access could retroactively help to avoid 
unintended pregnancies that had already occurred.
2013=0 0 1 This assumes that an insignificant number of potential 
pregnancies were impacted prior to the second quarter of 2013 
(as people are realizing their expanded insurance coverage, 







4.2.5 Demographic Variables 
The ten demographic variables listed in Table 2 were added to the model to help 
better control for time-varying factors that impact either the fertility or abortion rates 
directly or impact how the ACA contraceptive mandate would impact the outcomes. In 
some of the scatterplots of the dependent variable and each demographic variable, the 
relationship between the two variables changed across the range of the demographic 
variable. Partitioning the demographic variables into segments allowed for a more 
flexible specification so these changing relationships could be better captured. The effects 
of partitioning the demographic variables were tested by halves, quartiles, and quintiles.  
Table 5.2: Effect Coding Methods for Abortion Analyses
Method Label 2013 2014 Method Description
2013=0.75 0.75 1 Because it takes several weeks from unprotected sex to a 
positive pregnancy test, and then typically at least a couple more 
weeks until a woman could obtain an abortion, this method 
assumes that even if women had contraceptive access nearly 
immediately after the mandate went into effect, the would not be 
decrease in the abortion rate for at least the first couple months 
of the year. 
2013=0.5 0.5 1 Similar to the 2013=0.75 effect coding, this method takes the 
delays to positive pregnancy test and abortion procedure into 
account, but also assumes that there is at least a couple month 
lag before women are able to start new contraceptives after the 
mandate goes into effect. This would delay the impact of the 
contraceptive mandate on the abortion rate until roughly half 
way through the first year.
2013=1 1 1 This assumes that the full effect is seen starting as soon as the 
day the policy is in "full force." This unrealistically assumes that 
greater contraceptive access could retroactively help to avoid 
unintended pregnancies that had already occurred and, thus, 
immediately start avoiding abortions.
2013=0 0 1 This assumes that an insignificant number of potential 
pregnancies were avoided during the majority of 2013 as people 
are realizing their expanded insurance coverage, getting doctor's 





4.2.6 Lasso-Selected Demographic Variables 
Similar to the concerns about adding in superfluous state-specific time trends at 
the expense of the model’s power, there is also concern about overfitting the model with 
too many demographic variables to the detriment of the model’s overall power. 
Conversely, there is also concern about omitted variable bias, when an important 
independent variable is left out of the model, leading to biased estimates. To help find the 
optimal demographic variable list for each of the regression subgroups, the lasso2 
command in Stata was used to select the demographic variables for each regression. The 
Extended Bayesian Information Criteria (EBIC) was used as this method levies an 
additional penalty on the overall number of parameters, which decreases the likelihood of 
overselection. The lasso2 command utilizes an algorithm to iteratively add and drop 
variables to select the value of lambda that minimizes the EBIC. Any variables added 
prior to the algorithm identifying the minimum EBIC are included in the model. 
As is also the case with prior tests for model selection, the adjusted R-squared and 
estimated coefficients for the parameter of interest were compared to determine whether 
the full list of demographic variables or the lasso-selected demographic variables lead to 





5.0 Fertility Results and Discussion 
5.1 Fertility Results 
The regressions for the fertility analyses were run on the subpopulations outlined 
in Table 2, using a series of slightly differing models outlined in Figure 18 (to, among 
other things, test for robustness). The results of these multiple regression models are 
detailed in the following subsections. 
5.1.1 Fixed Effects versus Random Effects  
The first set of regressions modeling the impact of the ACA contraceptive 
mandate on fertility rates were done to determine whether to used fixed effects or random 
effects in the subsequent models. To do this, Equation 9 was used, exclusive of 
demographic variables. Each of the 50 regressions was modeled with both fixed effects 
and random effects separately, and the results were used to conduct a Hausman test.  
The full fixed effects regression results are available in Appendix Tables 4.1 to 
4.4. The first three rows of the regression results tables include the binary variables for 
the state mandates, the ACA contraceptive mandate, and the interaction of the two 
mandates. Following these binary variables are the individual year binary variables and 
the ten demographic variables, when included in later models. In these and all other 
Tables and Figures, the following abbreviations are used: “Black/AA” represents Black 
or African American, “White” represents White or Caucasian, “AIAN” represents 
American Indian or Alaskan Native, “API” represents Asian or Pacific Islander,” and 
“Hisp” and “Non-Hisp” represent Hispanic and Non-Hispanic. 
A subset of the Hausman test results, including the Hausman Test chi-square, 




Hausman Test statistic is significant, this indicates that the fixed effects models should be 
used as they yield unbiased estimates. If the Hausman Test statistic is insignificant, 
random effects models are preferred as they are more efficient. Five of the fourteen 
regressions in Table 6 have a Hausman Test statistic that is significant at the alpha=0.05 
level and an additional four that are significant at the alpha=0.10 level. Because of the 
mixed results, and because fixed effects better fits with the theory behind the model of 
fertility rates, it was decided to use fixed effects to minimize the risk of estimation bias 
and to maintain method consistency across the 50 regression subpopulations.  
 
5.1.2 State Fixed Effects versus State-Specific Time Trends 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, state fixed effects assumes that states have roughly 
parallel time trends, so testing was done to determine whether any states required state-
specific time trends in addition to state fixed effects. Two states—North Dakota and 
Utah—were determined to have sufficiently unique time trends to justify testing the 
inclusion of their state-specific time trends in the regression models. These states’ 
Table 6: Selected Fertility Analysis Hausman Test Results
Regression Category Subcategory Chi-Square DOF P-Value
ACA Only --
All Variables 8.25 2 0.0161*
Black/AA 7.36 2 0.0252*
White 0.92 2 0.6302
AIAN 6.54 3 0.0880
API 2.48 2 0.2895
Hispanic 5.68 2 0.0584
Non-Hispanic 15.59 2 0.0004*
15-19 5.33 2 0.0695
20-24 8.04 2 0.0179*
25-29 6.21 2 0.0448*
30-34 0.99 2 0.6089
35-39 5.17 2 0.0753
40-44 3.28 2 0.1940
*P-value indicates fixed effects is optimal at the alpha=0.05 level.
Hausman Test Results
All Data






fertility time trend lines are graphed in Figure 19, as well as a reference line for the mean 
fertility time trend of the remaining states. The full graph of all states’ fertility time trend 
lines is available in Appendix Figure 1. North Dakota was the only state with a generally 
increasing fertility rate during the time period. Although Utah’s trend line is not as 
dramatically different from the mean as North Dakota’s, the slope of the decline is much 
steeper given the much higher starting mean fertility rate. Thus, to ensure the best 
possible modeling of fertility rates, both states’ time trends were included in the testing of 
state-specific time trends.  
  
After these two states were identified, state-specific time trend parameters were 
included in the fixed effects regression model described in Section 5.1.1. The regression 
results are reported in Appendix Tables 5.1 to 5.4. To better visualize the impact of the 
inclusion of these two states’ time trends on the overall model’s goodness of fit, Figure 




























Figure 19: Selected State-Specific Crude Fertility Rates 
Compared to the Mean Trend of All Other States, 
All Women Ages 15-44, 2007-2017




state-specific time trend parameters. For this and all other graphs of ratios, the solid blue 
circle indicates that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at 
the alpha=0.05 level. The ratio is otherwise marked with a white circle outlined in black 
if either one or both estimated coefficients in the ratio were not statistically significant. 
Of the 50 regression models, 38 models have a higher adjusted R-squared when including 
the state-specific time parameters. An additional four models have an adjusted R-squared 
ratio between 0.9 and 1.0, indicating that the adjusted R-squared with state-specific time 
trends is within ten percent of those in models without state-specific time trends. Of the 
remaining eight models with adjusted R-squared ratios less than 0.9, four of them are for 
American Indian or Alaskan Native women in the four age groups between 25 and 44 
years old.  
Two ratios are not in the range of the graph: regression six (Asian or Pacific 
Islander women of all ages, ratio: -140.97) and regression 34 (Asian or Pacific Islander 
women ages 35 to 39, ratio: 32.83). For this and future graphs of the ratio of adjusted R-
squared values, any negative ratio indicates that one of the two adjusted R-squared values 
was less than zero, indicating a likely over-parameterized model. Figure 21 similarly 
graphs the ratio of the estimated ACA contraceptive mandate coefficients in models with 
versus without state-specific trend lines. Thirty-nine of the 50 ratios indicate that the 
estimated coefficients are within ten percent of each other and that the estimated 
coefficients are generally robust with the inclusion of state-specific time trends. Two 
groups are the most sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific time trends: American 
Indian or Alaskan Native women ages 35 to 39 (with the lowest ratio at 0.18) and Black 




subgroups became the primary interest of further analysis, it may be better to pursue 
models without state-specific trends. 
Overall, since the adjusted R-squared value generally increases when adding in 
the selected state-specific time trends (see Figure 20), it was decided to include the time 
trends for Utah and North Dakota in the final model. Although there are some differences 
in the estimated parameters between the two models with and without state-specific time 





























Figure 20: Fertility Analysis Ratio of Adjusted 
R-Squared with and without State-Specific Trends
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 




   
5.1.3 Population Weighting 
Whether to use population weighting was tested by running a series of regressions 
in which the top ten most populous states were iteratively excluded from the analysis. As 
explained in Section 4.2.3, because the goal of this research was to better understand how 
the ACA contraceptive mandate impacted fertility rates on a population level, it is 
assumed that population weights are the preferred method. However, when using 
population weights, there is the risk that one or more larger states unintentionally drive 
the overall result.  
To test for this, Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients and p-values for the 
ACA contraceptive mandate effect while iteratively dropping the top ten most populous 
states from the analysis. This table only reports a subset of the fifty total regressions. 
Omitting the states never resulted in an estimated coefficient with a changed sign or 
changed statistical significance from the reference regression results. However, omitting 
























Figure 21: Fertility Analysis Ratio of Estimated ACA 
Mandate Coefficients with and without State-Specific Trends
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 




of interest, respectively, for the regression model using all data for all ages and all races 
or ethnicities combined. Although there are not substantial differences for most 
subgroups, models with or without population weights should be used in the appropriate 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1.4 Effect Coding 
The methodology for effect coding outlined in Section 4.2.4 resulted in three 
different tests partially reported in Table 8 below: Panel 1 with estimated coefficient 
comparisons; Panel 2 testing for the correct sign of the estimated coefficient; and Panel 3 
calculating ratios of the estimated coefficients for different effect coding methods. The 
full results of this analysis from all fifty regressions are included in Appendix Tables 6.1 
through 6.4.  
Figures 22.1 through 22.3 below plot the ratios calculated in Panel 3 for all fifty 
regressions in each figure. The vertical axis has the same scale for all three figures to ease 
comparison across figures. Since the effect coding method of 2013=0.35 was selected for 
the final analysis, it is used as the comparison point for each of the three ratios. Figures 
22.1 to 22.3 indicate that with few exceptions the results are robust to the various choices 
of effect coding and the choice to use the 2013=0.35 method was not biasing the results. 
One subgroup—American Indian or Alaskan Native women ages 35 to 39, represented 
by regression 33—has a ratio in Figure 22.1 that does not fit on the scale of -1.97, which 
is the only ratio of the fifty regressions under three different effect coding comparisons 
that is below zero. The other two ratios for this subgroup in Figures 22.2 and 22.3 are 
1.33 and 0.75, suggesting that this subgroup is more sensitive to effect coding. However, 
all four estimated coefficients for this subgroup are relatively small and statistically 
insignificant. The other two subgroups that are relatively more impacted by effect coding 
choice are regression model 28 (White women ages 30 to 34) and 47 (Hispanic women 
ages 35 to 39). The full regression results utilizing the 2013=0.35 effect coding method 














Figure 22.1: Ratios of Effect Coding Estimated 
Coefficients: (2013=0.35)/(2013=1)
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 









Figure 22.2: Ratios of Effect Coding Estimated 
Coefficients: (2013=0.35)/(2013=0.5)
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 





5.1.5 Demographic Variables 
Following the addition of the effect coding method of 2013=0.35, the full list of 
demographic variables in Table 2 was added to the regressions to understand how the 
demographic variables help model the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on the 
fertility rates. The full regression results are available in Appendix Tables 8.1 to 8.4.  
To better visualize the impact of the inclusion of demographic variables on the 
goodness of fit and the estimated parameters of interest, Figures 23 and 24 plot the ratios 
of the adjusted R-squared and the estimated coefficients with and without demographic 
variables, respectively. These ratios are calculated from the output in Appendix Tables 
7.1 to 7.4 and Appendix Tables 8.1 to 8.4. These plots are similar to the state-specific 
time trend analyses presented in Figures 20 and 21 in Section 5.1.2. The vertical axis in 









Figure 22.3: Ratios of Effect Coding Estimated 
Coefficients: (2013=0.35)/(2013=0)
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 




across the various tests for model specification. Twenty-four of the 50 regressions have a 
higher adjusted R-squared value for the models that included demographic variables. An 
additional fourteen regressions have adjusted R-squared values within ten percent of the 
models without demographic variables. American Indian or Alaskan Native women ages 
35 to 39 were most sensitive to the inclusion of demographic variables, with an adjusted 
R-squared ratio of -3.96, the only ratio less than zero. However, the estimated ACA 
contraceptive mandate coefficients are statistically insignificant for this subgroup both in 
the models with and without demographic variables, suggesting that this relatively 
extreme ratio is less concerning.  
Figure 24 shows a relatively greater impact on the estimated coefficients with the 
addition of demographic variables than the impact adding selected state-specific time 
trends shown in Figure 21. Thirty-one of the 50 regressions had a smaller estimated 
coefficient with the demographic variables than without. This suggests that the models 
may generally overstate the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate when the 
demographic variables are not included. The ratios are generally the most extreme for 
regression models 27 through 38, representing women ages 30 to 44 by race, indicating 
that these groups are the most sensitive to the inclusion of demographic variables. Three 
of the seven most extreme values are for subpopulations whose regressions in models 
both with and without demographic variables yield statistically insignificant coefficients 
(all American Indian or Alaskan Native, ages 30 to 44). Two of the seven most extreme 
values had insignificant coefficients for models without demographic variables, but 
significant coefficients when the demographic variables were included (Asian or Pacific 
































Figure 23: Ratios of  Fertility ACA Mandate Adjusted 
R-Squared with and without Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at the alpha=0.05


























Figure 24: Ratios of  Fertility ACA Mandate Estimated 
Coefficients with and without Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at the alpha=0.05





5.1.6 Selecting Demographic Variables with Lasso 
Although the list of ten demographic variables were selected based on a literature 
review and supporting theory, as explained in Section 4.2.6, lasso2 was used in Stata to 
select the ideal demographic variable list for each of the fifty regressions. Each of these 
regressions was run with the model characteristics selected from the analyses in Sections 
5.1.1 through 5.1.4: fixed effects, selected state-specific time trends, population 
weighting, and effect coding. The full lasso regression results are below in Tables 9.1 to 
9.4. Similar to Figures 20 and 23, Figure 25 plots the ratios of the adjusted R-squared 
value in models with the full demographic variable list versus lasso-selected demographic 
variables. As well, similar to Figures 21 and 24, Figure 26 plots the ratio of the estimated 
ACA contraceptive mandate coefficients for the full demographic variable models versus 
lasso-selected demographic variable models.   
In line with patterns seen in Figure 23, the ratios of adjusted R-squared values in 
Figure 25 have the greatest variation for the regressions for the relatively older age 
groups with data by both age group and race (regressions 22 through 38, women ages 25 
to 44) or age group and ethnicity (regressions 45 to 50, women ages 30 to 44). Exactly 
half of the 50 regressions have higher adjusted R-squared values with the full 
demographic variable models and 32 of the 50 regressions have adjusted R-squared 
values within ten percent of the values with full demographic variables versus lasso-
selected demographic variables. Thus, for most regressions there is not a substantial 
impact on overall goodness of fit when choosing whether to use lasso. Since the lasso 
procedure removed nearly all or all of the demographic variables from the regressions by 




ratios are the highest for the same subpopulations in Figure 26 as in Figure 24: American 
Indian or Alaskan Native ages 30 to 44 (regression numbers 29, 33 and 37) and Hispanic 
women ages 35 to 39 (regression number 47). Regression 33, which represents American 
Indian or Alaskan Native ages 35 to 39, has a ratio of -392.67, far beyond the scale of 
Figure 26. Again, because most of these regression subpopulations have insignificant 
estimated coefficients, the extreme ratios are less concerning.  
To increase the ease of comparison of the ACA contraceptive mandate estimated 
effect both within the set of 50 regressions and between methods utilizing all 
demographic variables versus lasso-selected demographic variables, Figures 27.1 through 
27.4 below graph the estimated parameters along with the 95 percent confidence intervals 
for the fifty regressions in both modeling choices side-by-side (where part A graphs 
results for all demographic variables and part B graphs results for lasso-selected 
demographic variables). Estimated parameters for which the 95 percent confidence 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 25: Ratios of  Fertility ACA Mandate Adjusted R-Squared 
with All versus Lasso-Selected Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at the 
alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate either one or both estimated coefficients in the 




























Figure 26: Ratios of  Fertility ACA Mandate Estimated Coefficients 
with All versus Lasso-Selected Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at the alpha=0.05 level. 
































ACA Only All Black/AA White AIAN API Hisp Non-Hisp 
*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and demographic variables
Figure 27.1a: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
All Demographic Variables, All Ages, By Race or Ethnicity
 































ACA Only All Black/AA White AIAN API Hisp Non-Hisp 
*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and lasso-selected demographic variables
Figure 27.1b: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
Lasso-Selected Variables, All Ages, By Race or Ethnicity
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*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and demographic variables
Figure 27.2a: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
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Age Group of Mother
*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and lasso-selected demographic variables
Figure 27.2b: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
















































































































*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and demographic variables
Figure 27.3a: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
All Demographic Variables, By Age Group and Race
 









































































































*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and lasso-selected demographic variables
Figure 27.3b: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
Lasso-Selected Variables, By Age Group and Race
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*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and demographic variables
Figure 27.4a: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
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*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weighting, effect coding, and lasso-selected demographic variables
Figure 27.4b: Fertility ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*












5.2 Fertility Discussion 
This section will first discuss the testing that was done to determine the final 
model before discussing the details of the final model’s results.  
5.2.1 Discussion of Final Model Determination 
Six separate tests were done to decide on the final model: fixed effects versus 
random effects, state fixed effects only versus including selected state-specific time 
trends, population weighting, effect coding, demographic variable inclusion, and 
selecting demographic variables with the lasso2 command in Stata. 
The Hausman test results reported in Table 6 were utilized to determine to use 
fixed effects for all 50 regression subpopulations. This was decided because a majority of 
regressions had statistically significant Hausman Test statistics and because of the ability 
to minimize bias with fixed effects.  
Since the adjusted R-squared value generally increased when adding in the 
selected state-specific time trends (see Figure 20), it was decided to include the time 
trends for Utah and North Dakota in the final model. The results are generally consistent 
and robust to either including or excluding the state-specific time trends (see Figure 21).  
The estimated coefficients obtained when iteratively dropping the ten largest 
states reported in Table 7 showed the effects of population weighting when excluding 
California or Texas. Although population weights were used for the main model in this 
analysis, models with or without population weights should be used in the appropriate 
settings discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
Effect coding was next explored as a means to potentially more accurately model 




options listed in Table 5.1, coding 2013 with a value of one seemed to be the most 
inaccurate option given the realities of the timeline of the likely policy impacts. Waiting 
to estimate the policy impact until the next full year, in which case 2013 would be coded 
as zero and 2014 as one, seemed the next least ideal option. Thus, some value between 
zero and one seemed to be the best option, with testing done to ensure that theory of what 
should be the best way to model the impact of the ACA mandate lined up with reality.  
Graphs of the ratios of different effect coding methods’ estimated coefficients in 
Figures 22.1 to 22.3 show the impact of choosing a specific value for effect coding the 
ACA contraceptive mandate. Since the theory best supports a value of 2013=0.35, that set 
of regressions is the comparison point for the ratios. Figure 22.1 contrasts the 2013=0.35 
with what seems the least logical choice from a theoretical standpoint, where 2013=1 
(meaning that the full impact on the fertility rate started immediately on January 1, 2013). 
These ratios have the widest range of any of the ratios in Figures 22.1 to 22.3. Figure 
22.3, which compares the baseline with 2013=0 (which represents the full impact of the 
ACA contraceptive mandate happening on January 1, 2014), unsurprisingly has a 
narrower range of ratios. Finally, comparing the baseline with 2013=0.5 in Figure 22.2 
shows that the exact fraction used has little sizable impact for most of the regressions. In 
all three figures, regression 33 (American Indian or Alaskan Native ages 35 to 39) has the 
most variation in ratios. Three other subpopulations have more extreme ratios in the 
figures: regression 28 (White women ages 30 to 34), regression 34 (Asian or Pacific 
Islander women ages 35 to 39), and regression 47 (Hispanic women ages 35 to 39). It 
could be that the large differences in these specific subpopulations indicate a differential 




of the estimated coefficients for these racial/ethnic age groups are statistically significant 
in any of the effect coding models, it seems less important that the ratios are relatively 
high for these groups. Furthermore, for most subgroups, there are not substantial 
differences between the effect coding methods, indicating that this decision does not bias 
the final results. Since the effect coding method of 2013=0.35 seems to make the most 
sense when considering when and how the policy was implemented, it was selected for 
modeling the specific timing of the ACA contraceptive mandate. 
Demographic variables were next included in the model to help differentiate the 
impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate from other characteristics impacting the 
fertility rate during the same time period. Results were evaluated based on comparisons 
between adjusted R-squared values (Figure 23) and the estimated coefficients (Figure 24) 
in the models with and without demographic variables. As described in Section 5.1.5, 
when including demographic variables in the regression models, most of the 50 
regressions either had a higher adjusted R-squared value when including demographic 
variables in the model (n=24) or had an adjusted R-squared value within ten percent of 
the adjusted R-squared value of models excluding demographic variables (n=14). The 
most sensitive subpopulation to the inclusion of demographic variables—American 
Indian or Alaskan Native women ages 35 to 39—was deemed less of a concern because 
of the statistically insignificant estimated coefficients under both model assumptions. 
Thus, it seems that the overall fit was either improved or minimally decreased with the 
inclusion of demographic variables.  
The impact of including the demographic variables on the estimated coefficient is 




without demographic variables. Most of the ratios are fairly close to one, with 26 of the 
50 ratios between 0.5 and 1.5, indicating a difference of less than 50 percent between the 
estimated coefficients with and without demographic variables. The ratios are much 
larger in absolute value for a few of the subpopulations, including White women ages 30 
to 34 (regression 28), American Indian or Alaskan Native women ages 35 to 44 
(regressions 33 and 37), Asian or Pacific Islander women ages 35 to 39, and Hispanic 
women ages 35 to 39. This suggests a differential impact of the demographic variables 
for different subpopulations and potential confounding. Additionally, because 31 of the 
50 ratios are less than one, which happens when the estimated coefficient for the 
regressions with demographic variables is less than the coefficient for regressions without 
the demographic variables, this suggests that models that exclude the demographic 
variables may be overestimating the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on the 
fertility rate. Thus, to decrease the bias in the estimated coefficients, demographic 
variables should be included. 
 Although the demographic variables were selected based on a literature review 
and theory surrounding fertility choices, there can be concern about overfitting a model, 
especially as additional extraneous variables reduce the statistical power of a model, 
which is of greater concern in models with relatively fewer observations. Because of the 
sample size in this analysis, introducing ten demographic variables can significantly 
decrease the power of the analysis and increase confidence intervals. To address this 
issue, the lasso2 Stata command was used to select the optimal set of demographic 
variables for each of the 50 regressions. As discussed in Section 5.1.6, 32 of the 50 




comparing models with all versus lasso-selected demographic variables and exactly half 
of the 50 regressions have a higher adjusted R-squared with the full demographic 
variables (see Figure 25). Thus, for most regressions there is not a substantial impact on 
overall goodness of fit when choosing whether to use lasso. Although there are some 
regressions in Figure 26 that are outliers in the ratio of estimated coefficients, most of the 
subpopulations have insignificant estimated parameters for the ACA contraceptive 
mandate variable, which makes these more extreme ratios less concerning.  
Since the differences in adjusted R-squared values between models with the full 
demographic variables and models with lasso-selected demographic variables did not 
clearly indicate which modeling specification would be preferred for all 50 regression 
models, Figure 27 was included to help highlight the differences in estimated parameters 
for the 50 regressions under the two different model specifications. It is clear when 
comparing panel A and panel B that the lasso2 command did exactly what was intended, 
which was to select the most important demographic variables to limit the effect on 
power. This led to much more precise estimates in panel B and much broader 95% 
confidence intervals in panel A. The coefficient estimates are generally robust with either 
the full demographic variables or lasso-selected demographic variables and follow 
roughly the same general patterns and relationships when comparing races, ethnicities, 
age groups, or a combination of race/ethnicity and age groups. Some exceptions include 
that the coefficients for the two regressions for “All Data” become insignificant but 
remain negative and the coefficients for Asian or Pacific Islanders and non-Hispanic 




whether for all ages combined or by age group when comparing the two modeling 
choices.  
The adjusted R-squared doesn’t make a clear case for either the full demographic 
variable model or lasso-selected models for all regressions as a whole. However, the 
much greater precision gained via utilizing lasso2 to select demographic variables makes 
the models with lasso-selected demographic variables slightly more preferable to models 
with the full demographic variables when considering the entire set of 50 regressions 
together. When looking at an individual subpopulation, it would make sense to consider 
both modeling choices and compare adjusted R-squared values for that specific 
subpopulation. Further discussion of the exact estimates in the final model follows in 
Section 5.2.2. 
5.2.2 Discussion of Final Model Results and Trends 
The final model results generally show a statistically significant reduction in 
fertility rate due to the ACA contraceptive mandate. Many of the 50 regressions also 
show a statistically significant effect of the state-specific contraceptive mandates, though 
smaller in magnitude than the estimated effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate. This is 
what was expected, as the state-specific mandates did not impact as many people or 
reduce the copayments for contraceptives to zero. Because there is variation in results by 
sub-population, these results will be discussed individually. 
The first two regressions in Table 9.1 were run with all of the data aggregated to 
show the average effects of the ACA contraceptive mandate on the entire population. The 
first regression only has the ACA contraceptive mandate binary variable and the second 




specific mandates, the ACA contraceptive mandate, and the interaction of the two. In the 
lasso-selected models, both of these regressions have insignificant estimated coefficients 
for the ACA contraceptive mandate. However, both of these regressions have a higher 
adjusted R-squared in the model with the full demographic variables, where both 
regressions have a statistically significant estimated coefficient for the ACA 
contraceptive mandate (see Appendix Table 8.1). The first model estimates a decrease in 
the fertility rate of 3.569 births per thousand women (95% CI [-6.23, -0.90], 2012 US 
mean: 63.0 births per 1,000 women). The second regression includes all three policy 
binary variables to estimate the impact of state-specific mandates, the ACA contraceptive 
mandate, and the interaction of the two. All three policy binary variables have a negative 
coefficient and are statistically significant, showing the greatest decrease for the ACA 
contraceptive mandate: -4.277 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-6.86, -0.22], 2012 US 
mean: 63.0 births per 1,000 women). It is important to separate these two regressions to 
verify that the effect attributed to the ACA mandate is not simply coming from the state-
specific mandates. It is interesting to note that adding in the state-specific mandates 
actually increases the absolute value of the impact of the ACA mandate, with states with 
mandates experiencing an additional decrease in fertility of 0.844 births per 1,000 women 
(95% CI [-1.20, -0.49]). These two estimated impacts on the fertility rate translate to a 
nationwide estimate of roughly 299,179 births averted annually. The presence of 
significant interaction effects in Appendix Table 8.1 implies that the model with all three 
policy variables is better at appropriately allocating effects than the model with the ACA 
policy variable alone. These two models show a roughly five percent reduction in the 




confirms what previous related studies have generally found, which is the ACA 
contraceptive mandate decreasing the fertility rate by a small but statistically significant 
amount.  
The first regression sub-population groups were done by four racial categories: 
Black/African American, White/Caucasian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and Asian 
or Pacific Islander (see Table 9.1). All four groups had a statistically significant estimated 
coefficient for the ACA contraceptive mandate in the lasso-selected models. All four 
groups also had statistically significant estimates of the interaction term between the state 
mandates and ACA mandate, but the coefficient was negative for only White women. 
The coefficient was the largest in absolute value for the American Indian/Alaskan Native 
population, with an estimated decrease of 17.93 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-19.59, 
-15.48], 2012 US mean: 47.0) overall. The interaction term between the ACA 
contraceptive mandate and the state-specific mandates estimated that states with 
mandates had an additional relative increase in the fertility rate of 5.49 births per 1,000 
women (95% CI [3.81, 7.18]) when the ACA contraceptive mandate went into effect. The 
White subpopulation had the smallest estimated decrease of 3.46 births per 1,000 women 
(95% CI [-4.70, -2.22], 2012 US mean: 58.6) overall and an additional decrease in states 
with contraceptive mandates of 1.40 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-1.84, -0.96]). The 
95 percent confidence intervals are much wider for the American Indian/Alaskan Native 
and the Asian or Pacific Islander subpopulations, which is a trend seen with these two 
races in all of the regressions by subpopulations, though much more apparent in the 
regressions with the full demographic variable list rather than the lasso-selected models. 




so, for example, the “White” category includes both White Hispanic and White Non-
Hispanic women. This somewhat complicates the interpretation of the variables, but a 
further breakdown of the data by both race and ethnicity were not available. The results 
of this subpopulation’s regressions provide greater context for later regressions by race 
and age category.  
The second subpopulation of regressions is run by Hispanic and Non-Hispanic 
ethnicity (see Table 9.1). Similar to the discussion of race categories, these categories are 
only by ethnicity, so the Hispanic population is largely comprised of women in the 
White/Caucasian racial category with an additional small group from the Black/African 
American racial category. Non-Hispanic, however, includes people from all four of the 
race categories as long as they do not report having Hispanic ethnicity. Seeing the range 
of results in the prior subpopulation by race illuminates the difficulty in making the 
comparisons between Hispanic and Non-Hispanic when the data are also not further 
categorized by race. That said, there was a statistically significant decrease in the fertility 
rate for Hispanics of 27.55 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-29.84, -25.26], 2012 US 
mean: 74.4) overall with an additional decrease in states with mandates of 3.20 births per 
1,000 women (95% CI [-5.16, -1.24]). The estimated effect was statistically significant 
but much smaller for Non-Hispanics: -3.15 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-4.06, -
2.25]). Since the Hispanic population is largely White, when combining the results by 
race with the results by ethnicity, it seems likely that the reduction in fertility due to the 
ACA contraceptive mandate for Non-Hispanic Whites is likely less than the estimated 




The third subpopulation of regressions was done by five-year age categories from 
15 through 44 (see Table 9.1). In these lasso-selected regressions, the estimated 
coefficient for the ACA contraceptive mandate was statistically significant at the 
alpha=0.01 level for all six age categories. Ages 15 through 29 show an estimated 
decrease in the fertility rate while ages 30 to 44 show an estimated increase in the fertility 
rate. This same trend is repeated throughout later regressions for younger versus older 
age groups. The greatest estimated decrease in the fertility rate is for women between 20 
and 24 years old, with the model estimating a decline in 27.48 births per 1,000 women 
(95% CI [-30.44, -24.53], 2012 US mean: 83.1) overall and an additional decrease of 2.54 
births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-3.39, -1.68]) in states with mandates. The estimated 
decrease for 25 to 29-year-olds is slightly smaller at 21.38 births per 1,000 women (95% 
CI [-24.89, -17.86], 2012 US mean: 106.5) overall plus an additional decrease of 1.33 
births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-2.22, -0.45]) in states with mandates, which is roughly 
three times the estimated decrease of 6.71 births per 1,000 women between ages 15 and 
19 (95% CI [-8.94, -4.48], 2012 US mean: 29.4). It may initially seem counterintuitive 
that the ACA contraceptive mandate would have the smallest effect on women between 
15 and 19 when such a large proportion of those births are unintended. The estimated 
coefficients are measuring the change in the fertility rate and not the percent reduction in 
unintended pregnancies. Although a lower percent of pregnancies in ages 20 to 24 are 
unintended, there is a much higher overall birthrate, and thus a higher absolute 
unintended pregnancy rate, for women ages 20 to 24 (see Figures 7 and 8).  
The fourth subpopulation groupings are by the four race categories and the six 




the Black/African American population, the youngest three age groups have a statistically 
significant decrease in fertility due to the ACA contraceptive mandate while the oldest 
three age groups have a statistically insignificant decrease in the lasso-selected models. 
However, all but the 20-24 age group regressions have higher adjusted R-squared values 
in the models with full demographic variables where all six age groups have a negative 
estimated coefficient, though only the youngest three age groups are statistically 
significant (see Appendix Tables 8.2 and 8.3). Unlike the results by age group only where 
the highest decreases in fertility were in the 20 to 24 and then 25 to 29 age groups, for the 
Black/African American group, 15 to 19 has the second largest decrease in fertility 
closely after the 20 to 24 age group, at -36.69 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-37.87, -
35.51], 2012 US mean: 44.0) overall. The ACA/state policy interaction term estimated an 
additional increase in fertility post-ACA contraceptive mandate implementation of 5.28 
births per 1,000 women (95% CI [4.32, 6.25]) in states with mandates. Finally, the Black-
African American population between ages 20 and 24 had the second largest estimated 
decrease in fertility of all of the 24 race-age group subcategories, at 38.16 births per 
1,000 women (95% CI [-39.95, -36.37], 2012 US mean: 108.7).  
Similar to the discussion of prior results, interpreting the results for the White race 
category are slightly more complex because it includes both White Hispanic women and 
Non-Hispanic White women. As seen in Figures 27.3a and 27.3b, White women have the 
least differences between the models with full demographic variables and lasso-selected 
demographic variables. In this race category, the three youngest age groups show a 
statistically significant estimated decrease in the fertility rate and ages 30 to 44 have a 




The relative patterns of the estimated coefficients of the three younger age groups follow 
the same relationship seen in the regressions only by age group, with the largest 
estimated decrease of 27.46 births per thousand White women ages 20 to 24 (95% CI [-
29.98, -24.94], 2012 US mean: 80.8) overall plus an additional decrease of 3.78 births per 
1,000 women (95% CI [-4.76, -2.80]) in states with mandates. Following this age group 
is ages 25 to 29 with the second highest decrease, then ages 15 to 19.  
The results for the American Indian/Alaskan Native women by age group have 
the widest confidence intervals of the four races, and are much wider than the confidence 
intervals for Black/African American and White women, especially in the models with 
the full demographic variables (see Figures 27.3a and 27.3b). This is not surprising 
because the American Indian/Alaskan Native population is relatively much smaller and 
there are not data for all states for all years for each of this race’s age group categories 
(see Tables 9.2 and 9.3 for the count of states included for each age category). Four of the 
six age groups have an estimated negative coefficient for the ACA contraceptive mandate 
variable, but only three of the four are statistically significant at the alpha=0.05 level—
women ages 15 to 29. The estimated decrease for women ages 20 to 24 is the highest of 
all of the 24 race-age category combinations, with an estimated 50.97 fewer births per 
1,000 American Indian/Alaskan Native women (95% CI [-55.95, -45.99], 2012 US mean: 
81.7) overall plus an estimated increase in the fertility rate by 17.14 births per 1,000 
women (95% CI [13.06, 21.22]) in states with mandates.  
The final race category includes Asian or Pacific Islander women. This group’s 
ACA mandate coefficients had statistically significant decreases in fertility rates for ages 




Asian or Pacific Islander group is the only racial category that had a statistically 
significant estimated decrease for women ages 30 to 34: -4.59 births per 1,000 women 
(95% CI [-7.44, -1.75], 2012 US mean: 121.3). Similar to the White population, the 
Asian or Pacific Islander population had the second largest estimated fertility decrease in 
ages 25 to 29 instead of 15 to 19. For reasons likely similar to those discussed with the 
American Indian/Alaskan Native population, the confidence intervals for the Asian or 
Pacific Islander women are relatively large, especially when looking at results from 
models with the full demographic variables (see Figures 27.3a and 27.3b). 
The final regression subpopulation groups are by ethnicity and age group (see 
Table 9.4). Hispanic women had a statistically significant estimated decrease in fertility 
for women ages 15 through 34. The estimated decrease for ages 20 to 24 was the second 
largest estimated decrease in fertility of the 50 regressions, at 45.41 births per 1,000 
women (95% CI [-51.06, -39.76], 2012 US mean: 111.5) overall plus an additional 
estimated decrease of 6.10 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-8.58, -3.61]) in states with 
a mandate. The estimated decrease for women ages 15 to 19 was next highest, at 45.37 
births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-48.13, -42.62], 2012 US mean: 46.3). The estimated 
decrease for Hispanic women ages 25 to 29 was roughly two thirds that of women ages 
15 to 24: -30.56 (95% CI [-33.95, -27.18], 2012 US mean: 119.6) overall plus an 
additional -8.1 births per 1,000 women (95% CI [-11.0, -5.20]) in states with a mandate. 
The estimated coefficient for the two older age categories implies an increase in fertility, 
but only the coefficient for ages 40 to 44 is statistically significant. Non-Hispanic women 
had a statistically significant estimated decrease in fertility rates for the three youngest 




ages. Non-Hispanic women ages 30 to 44 had a statistically significant estimated increase 
in fertility. Again, the Non-Hispanic category is not the same as Non-Hispanic White, so 
should be interpreted accordingly. 
Overall, the results were consistent in showing the biggest estimated reductions in 
fertility in specific segments of the population: those that were younger and those in a 
racial or ethnic minority. This is not surprising, because, as discussed in Section 2.3, 
these are the segments of the population that have the highest rates of unintended 
pregnancies. Assuming that a policy change that increases contraceptive availability and 
use would result in a decrease in unplanned pregnancies, different effects should be 
expected in across segments with differing unplanned pregnancy rates. 
Previous studies have largely found a small or insignificant effect of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate on fertility rates roughly similar to the modest approximate 5 
percent decrease in the first two regressions with all data combined across age categories, 
race and ethnicity. When the data are not broken down further by age, race, and ethnicity, 
it is impossible to isolate the segments of the population that are at greatest risk for 
unplanned pregnancy. The 48 regressions that follow the initial two regressions in this 
analysis highlight the importance of determining the effect of contraceptive policies on 
more specific subgroups than the US population as a whole, where, for example, the 
ACA contraceptive mandate was estimated to have decreased fertility rates for women 
ages 20 to 25 by 33.1 percent and 37.0 percent for Hispanic women. 
Perhaps most surprising in this analysis were the statistically significant estimated 
increases in fertility rates for the older age groups. These findings were fairly consistent 




seems somewhat counterintuitive that a contraceptive policy that expands access and 
affordability would increase the fertility rates for certain populations. However, as 
mentioned in Section 2.7, the ACA contraceptive mandate was only one part of the ACA, 
which had a major impact on health insurance availability and healthcare costs.  
One potential explanation for the increases in fertility rates among older age 
groups is the increased access to ART via the state EHBs discussed in Section 2.7. To test 
this hypothesis, the regressions by age group were run separately for states with and 
without ART required coverage in their EHB benchmark plans (see Appendix Table 2). 
The two groups of states had different estimated effects of the ACA contraceptive 
mandate on fertility rates, especially on older age groups. However, the women in states 
with EHBs requiring ART coverage had a lower estimated impact of the ACA on fertility 
rates (see Appendix Figures 2.1 to 2.3), which is the opposite of what was expected. It 
could be that women in states without EHBs requiring ART coverage are only seeing the 
cost of having a child at any age decrease with the increased health insurance coverage 
and decreased healthcare costs, which is resulting in increased demand for an additional 
child. Conversely, women in states with EHBs requiring ART coverage could be 
intentionally choosing to delay having children because they know that infertility services 
will be much more affordable if they need them later due to their lower fertility at older 
ages due to a delay in childbearing. It is clear that there is some difference between these 
two groups of states that is likely not limited to only the differences in state EHB 
requirements. Further investigation may help elucidate the differing experiences of these 





The final set of regression models generally pass various checks of robustness and 
the findings do not contradict prior literature and theory while filling a substantial 
research gap in the knowledge about the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on 
fertility rates. 
This work is the first to look at the effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate by 
all of the various subpopulation categories. This is crucial because of the wide range of 
differences in unplanned pregnancies and pre-ACA contraceptive access and use by these 
age, race, and ethnicity subcategories.  
This work is also the first to include binary variables for the effect of state-
specific contraceptive mandates in addition to the effect of the ACA contraceptive 
mandate. Including the state-specific policy variables allows the model to more 
accurately attribute each policy’s impact.  
5.2.4 Limitations 
The main limitations to this analysis are due to data availability. The fertility data 
were at most broken down by either race plus age or ethnicity plus age. Fertility data by 
race and ethnicity or race and ethnicity and age are not reported consistently in every 
state in the US. Having those data would help to better understand the impact of the ACA 
contraceptive mandate on all subpopulations, but would be especially useful in 
understanding the impact for Non-Hispanic White women.  
Additionally, the fertility data and the demographic variables are all at the state 
level. It is expected that there would be substantial fluctuation in fertility preferences and 




However, all of the required data for this analysis are not available at a geography smaller 
than the state level for all states in the US and across all years.  
As well, it is likely that some of the demographic variables are confounded with 
the ACA. Decisions regarding fertility are highly complex and are influenced by 
individual family norms, local culture, both current and expected household income, 
desired family size, etc. It is likely that there are variables not included in this model that 
may be better at capturing these factors, especially for certain subpopulations, like Asians 
or Pacific Islanders, whose lasso regressions omitted most demographic variables.  
Additionally, the data utilized in this analysis cannot be used to separate out 
unintended from intended fertility. It is expected that the reductions in fertility due to the 
ACA contraceptive mandate would largely impact unintended fertility, but that cannot be 
separately measured and analyzed with these data.  
The final main limitation is that economic fluctuations affect fertility preferences 
in general and the Great Recession has had a unique impact on fertility rates. Fertility 
trends are strongly linked with economic indicators (Schneider, 2015) and the typical 
rebound in fertility rates post-recession has still yet to materialize after the Great 
Recession (Schneider, 2015; Seltzer, 2019; Buckles, et al., 2020). This is especially 
complicated in this analysis because the unemployment rates vary across states and vary 
even more across counties within states, with greater unemployment in geographic areas 
that historically have had more jobs in the manufacturing industries (Seltzer, 2019). This 
analysis included two demographic variables that should help to model this 
relationship—the unemployment rate and median household income—but the Great 




ability to afford additional children, which is not fully captured in this analysis (Hartnett 
& Gemmill, 2020). Even with these variables included in the models, there may be some 
residual confounding affecting the results.   
5.2.5 Policy Implications 
This analysis shows that the ACA contraceptive mandate was generally effective 
at reducing the fertility rate, with greater effectiveness for specific subpopulations 
previously at higher risk for unintended pregnancy. Historically, there has been 
uncertainty about the mandate’s effectiveness because of the multiple steps between 
issuing a mandate and reducing the fertility rate, including getting a doctor’s 
appointment, obtaining a prescription for contraceptives, picking up the contraceptives, 
and using the contraceptives correctly and consistently. This analysis shows that the ACA 
contraceptive mandate ultimately has the intended effect of the policy. 
 Assuming that the estimated decrease in fertility rate due to the ACA 
contraceptive mandate was largely from decreasing unintended pregnancies (Buckles, et 
al., 2019), and assuming that helping women avoid unintended pregnancies is a goal 
worth pursuing, the ACA contraceptive mandate or a similar policy should continue. If 
resources were limited, and if and this were in a single-payor system of insurance, for 
example, priority for free contraceptives should be given to women between ages 15 and 
29 and to women belonging to minority racial and ethnic groups. 
Even if the federal or state governments choose to discontinue the ACA 
contraceptive mandate or similar state-specific mandates, private insurance companies 
should explore following a similar policy in their own insurance benefit plans to help 




likely save insurance companies the costs of prenatal and postpartum care for unintended 
pregnancies avoided via greater contraceptive access. 
Relevant government agencies could pursue related research to further clarify 
these findings for greater policy guidance. This research could attempt to locate data on a 
more granular level than the state level, add in contraceptive method mix data, or add in 





6.0 Abortion Results and Discussion 
This chapter has two main sections: the abortion analysis results (6.1) and 
discussion (6.2). The results section will report the testing done to determine the final 
model and include details of the final model’s results. The discussion section will cover 
both the final model selection and interpretations from the final model.  
6.1 Abortion Results 
The regressions for the abortion analyses were run on the subpopulations listed in 
Table 3 and in the order indicated in the decision tree in Figure 18. The results of these 
multiple regression models are detailed in the following subsections. 
6.1.1 Fixed Effects versus Random Effects 
The first models were designed to determine whether to used fixed effects or 
random effects in the subsequent models. These regressions utilized Equation 9 but 
omitted the demographic variables. Each of the fifteen regressions was modeled with 
both fixed effects and random effects, and the results were used to conduct a Hausman 
Test. The full regression results for the fixed effects and random effects regressions are 
available in Appendix Tables 9 and 10, respectively. The Hausman Test chi-square, 
degrees of freedom, and corresponding p-values are listed in Table 10 by the regression 
category and subcategory. Again, if the Hausman Test statistic is significant, fixed effects 
models are preferred in order to obtain unbiased estimates. If the statistic is insignificant, 
however, there is no difference between the estimates under fixed effects or random 
effects, so random effects should be used as they yield more efficient estimates.  
As per Table 10, Hausman Tests statistics for models with data on residence, state 




Table 10 had a p-value less than 0.05 and an additional three regressions had a p-value 
between 0.05 and 0.1. All seven of these models were regressions with either full data or 
data by age group. None of the four regressions with race or ethnicity had significant or 
borderline significant Hausman test results. However, it was decided to use fixed effects 
for all models to ensure unbiased estimates and to use consistent methodology across all 
fifteen regression subcategories. As seen in Appendix Tables 9 and 10, the differences in 
estimated coefficients and standard errors are minor for most of the regressions except for 
the four regressions for which the Hausman Test indicated that fixed effects must be 
used. Although using fixed effects will potentially come at a cost of some efficiency for 
some models, it seems reasonable to move forward using only fixed effects to ensure 
unbiased estimates of all models. This is especially the case as the results are generally 
robust to either decision. 
  
Table 10: Abortion Analysis Hausman Test Results
Regression Category Subcategory Chi-Square DOF P-Value
ACA Only 4.08 2 0.1300
All Variables 13.74 4 0.0082**
ACA Only 4.00 2 0.1356
All Variables 8.99 4 0.0614*
11-14 25.00 10 0.0054**
15-19 20.26 7 0.0050**
20-24 13.12 7 0.0692*
25-29 11.98 7 0.1012
30-34 12.66 7 0.0809*
35-39 14.38 7 0.0448**
40-44 15.24 10 0.1236
NH White 14.23 10 0.1628
NH Black 8.60 10 0.5705
NH Other 10.26 10 0.4178
Hispanic 12.72 10 0.2396
**P-value indicates fixed effects is optimal at the alpha=0.05 level.
*P-value indicates fixed effects is optimal at the alpha=0.1 level.
By Woman's Residence
By State of Occurrence






6.1.2 State Fixed Effects versus State-Specific Time Trends 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, states that did not have roughly parallel abortion 
trend lines were identified to test for the potential inclusion of state-specific time trends. 
Three states—Louisiana, Maine, and Michigan—were determined to have sufficiently 
non-parallel trend lines to justify testing their state-specific time trends. These three 
states’ abortion trend lines are graphed in Figure 28, along with the reference line 
showing the mean abortion trend line for all other states combined. The full graph of all 
states’ abortion trend lines is included in Appendix Figure 3. 
Michigan was the only state with a steadily-increasing trend in abortions over 
nearly the entire time period. Louisiana only had a slight increase between 2009 and 
2016, but the atypical inverted shallow-U shape made it seem reasonable to include a 
time trend for Louisiana. Maine had a net decrease over the 2009-2016 period, but was 
included because of the sharp decline between 2010 and 2012 which was followed by a 
sharp rise between 2012 and 2013. Although it was not noted in the data source, this 
could be due to data reporting differences or a data reporting error, or it could be 
accurate. However, the pattern is substantially different from other states to justify 




   
After identifying these three states, the fixed effects regression model described in 
Section 6.1.1 was modified to include these state-specific time trends. The full regression 
results are available in Appendix Table 11. To better understand the impact of the 
inclusion of state-specific time trends on the regressions’ goodness of fit, Figure 29 
graphs the ratio of the adjusted R-squared for models with and without the state-specific 
time trends. Figure 30 similarly graphs the ratio of the estimated ACA mandate 
coefficients for models with and without the state-specific time trends for each of the 
fifteen abortion regressions to show the change in the estimated impact of the ACA 
mandate on abortion rates. Again, ratios are graphed in a solid blue circle when both 
models’ estimates are statistically significant for the regression subpopulation. When one 
or both models’ estimates are insignificant, the ratio is graphed with a black-outlined 























Figure 28: Selected State-Specific Abortion Trend Lines 
Compared to the Mean Trend of All Other States, 
All Women Ages 11-44, 2009-2016




 When adding additional variables for the three states’ time trends, the adjusted R-
squared increased for eleven of the fifteen models, showing that including these state-
specific time trends allowed for better overall modeling of the abortion rates. Regression 
ten—which is the model for women ages 35 to 39—shows a very high ratio because the 
initial adjusted R-squared without state time trends was only 0.0225, so increasing the 
adjusted R-squared to 0.142 manifested as a massive jump. Regressions five (women 
ages 11 to 14) and six (women ages 15 to 19) had ratios just barely less than one (0.974 
and 0.997, respectively), indicating a slight model preference for excluding state-specific 
trends for these subpopulations. Regressions eleven (women ages 40 to 44, which is 
statistically insignificant) and fifteen (Hispanic women) had the lowest ratios (0.739 and 
0.856, respectively), indicating that the additional variables did not improve the model 
for these two subpopulations. 
In Figure 30, fourteen of the fifteen regressions have a ratio of the estimated 
coefficients between 0.98 and 1.17, showing a very modest effect on the ACA mandate 
estimated coefficient when including state-specific time trends. Given that the state-
specific trends that were included were for states with non-parallel abortion time trends, it 
is not surprising that the inclusion of these specific states’ trends would increase the 
estimated impact of the ACA contraception mandate. It is interesting that the ratios show 
higher estimated coefficients with state-specific trends included for all the regressions 
except for the four regressions by race or ethnic subcategory. These ratios were all 
between 0.98 and 1.0, however, so the estimates are not significantly lower when 
including state-specific time trends. The ratio standing out the most is for regression 




coefficient under the state-specific time trends model. However, this coefficient’s 
estimates were both relatively small (from -0.07 to -0.12) and were statistically 
insignificant under both models, making this ratio of little concern. 
Combining results from Figure 29 and Figure 30, it seems reasonable to include 
the time trends for these three states in the final model. Their inclusion increased the 
adjusted R-squared, indicating better fit. Additionally, the estimated coefficients between 
the two models were relatively similar, indicating the robustness of the model regardless 

























Figure 29: Abortion Analysis Ratio of Adjusted 
R-Squared with and without State-Specific Trends
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 





6.1.3 Population Weights 
Whether to use population weighting was tested by running a series of regressions 
in which the most populous states were iteratively excluded from the analysis. Since the 
different regression subpopulations do not all include the same states due to differences 
in data availability across states, twelve total states were iteratively excluded from the 
analysis to ensure that each of the fifteen regressions had a minimum of ten states 
dropped from the analysis. The estimated coefficient and corresponding p-value for the 
ACA mandate parameter are included for all fifteen abortion regressions in Table 11 
below. I find that omitting large states had minimal impact on results so population 
weighting can be implemented with minimal impact on effect size. Population weighted 
results measure the treatment effect for one individual. Unweighted results measure the 
treatment effect for one state and would be relevant to state legislation. Table 11 suggests 
that by and large, these results are similar. However, as discussed in Section 4.2.3, future 




























Figure 30: Abortion Analysis Ratio of Estimated ACA 
Mandate Coefficients with and without State-Specific Trends
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at the 
alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate either one or both estimated 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.1.4 Effect Coding 
Following the methodology outlined in Section 4.2.4, three different tests were 
conducted to determine appropriate use of effect coding in the abortion analyses. These 
three tests’ results for all fifteen regressions are included in the three panels of Table 12 
below. Panel 1 reports the estimated coefficients for each of the four effect coding 
methods, Panel 2 tests whether the estimated coefficient has the correct sign, and Panel 3 
reports ratios of estimated coefficients for different effect coding methods. Figures 31.1 
through 31.3 graph the ratios listed in Panel 3 to better visualize the differences in the 
effect coding methods. The vertical axis has the same scale for all three figures to ease 
comparison across figures. As the effect coding method of 2013=0.75 was selected for 
the final analysis, it is used as the comparison point for each of the three ratios. The full 
regression results with effect coding of 2013=0.75 are available in Appendix Table 12. 
These analyses show that the results were generally robust regardless of the effect 
coding method used, as evidenced by the relatively small ratios of estimated coefficients 
presented in Figures 31.1 through 31.3. Figure 31.1 shows the biggest range of ratios 
because the effect coding method of 2013=0 implies that there is no impact of the ACA 
mandate on abortions for a full year after the January 1, 2013 full implementation date. 
Similar to the results with the state-specific time trends, the largest exception was for 
women ages 40 to 44. Again, the estimated coefficient for this subpopulation is very 
small and statistically insignificant in each of the four methods of effect coding, so small 
changes in the estimated coefficient lead to much larger changes in the ratio. Regression 
thirteen (representing Black/African American women) is the next most sensitive to the 




coding methods in Figure 31.1, the estimated coefficients for regression thirteen only 
differ by approximately ten percent. Because results are generally robust regardless of the 
effect coding method used, the effect coding of 2013=0.75 was selected for the final 
model because it seems the most accurate reflection of when the ACA contraceptive 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   










Figure 31.1: Abortion Analysis Ratio of Effect Coding 
Estimated Coefficients: 2013=0.75/2013=0
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 










Figure 31.2: Abortion Analysis Ratio of Effect Coding 
Estimated Coefficients: 2013=0.75/2013=0.5
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 




    
6.1.5 Demographic Variables 
The full Equation 9 was used to run fixed effects regressions with selected state-
specific trends, population weights, effect coding of 2013=0.75 and the ten demographic 
variables outlined in Table 2 plus the number of abortion clinics per 100,000 women in 
each state. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, four of the demographic variables—percent 
with high school degrees, percent with college degrees, median household income, and 
mean family size—were divided into quartiles to allow for a more flexible specification 
of the models, as the relationship between these variables and the abortion rates differed 
across the range of the demographic variable.  
The results for the fifteen regressions are reported in Table 13. Again, the 
estimated coefficient for the variable “ACA Mandate in Effect” is the effect of the ACA 
mandate on abortion rates in states without contraceptive mandates. The sum of the 
estimated coefficients for “ACA Mandate in Effect” and “State Mandate * ACA 










Figure 31.3: Abortion Analysis Ratio of Effect Coding 
Estimated Coefficients: 2013=0.75/2013=1
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate 




mandates. To better understand the relative sizes and significance of the ACA mandate 
parameter of interest, the main coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for each of 
the fifteen regressions are graphed in Figure 32.  
Finally, Figures 33 and 34 graph the ratios of the adjusted R-squared and ACA 
mandate estimated coefficients with and without the demographic variables (with data 
from Table 13 and Appendix Table 12, respectively) to understand the impact of 
including the demographic variables on the main parameter of interest.  
In Figure 33, twelve of the fifteen regressions have higher adjusted R-squared 
values when including demographic variables and the other three ratios indicate an 
adjusted R-squared within two, three, and ten percent for regressions numbered three, 
four, and eight, respectively. The very slightly lower R-squared is less concerning in 
regressions three and four, which represent the two regressions by state of occurrence. As 
a reminder, the demographic variables are state-level and the abortion data for these two 
regressions are for state of abortion occurrence instead of state of the woman’s residence. 
This slight difference could make the addition of the demographic variables slightly less 
powerful than in regressions one and two, which are the same regressions but with 
abortion data by state of the woman’s residence.  Thus, it seems that including the 
demographic variables slightly increases the models’ overall goodness of fit for the 
abortion analysis with data by state of residence but slightly decreases the goodness of fit 
for data by state of occurrence as the power lost due to increased variables outweighs the 
gain in additional information.  
It is unclear why there is a roughly ten percent decrease in the adjusted R-squared 




statistically significant demographic variables and their estimated values are within the 
range of the other fourteen regressions. Additionally, the sample size for this subgroup is 
the same for other age groups between 15 and 39, so it is not due to a dramatically lower 
sample size with power that is easily affected by the number of variables in the model. It 
seems that, for whatever reason, the demographic variables are less able to model the 
abortion rate for this age group.  
Despite the results for these three regressions, for most regressions, adding in 
additional demographic variables yields a better model of abortion rates, as seen by 
increased adjusted R-squared values. For this reason, the full list of demographic 
variables were included in the final model. 
Similar to Figure 30, Figure 34 graphs the ratios of the estimated ACA mandate 
coefficients for the models with and without demographic variables (with data from 
Table 13 and Appendix Table 12). Thirteen of the fifteen ratios are greater than one, 
indicating that the model with demographic variables has higher estimated ACA mandate 
coefficients for all models except for regressions three and four, which are again the two 
regressions with data by state of abortion occurrence. These two regressions also had a 
lower adjusted R-squared value with the addition of the demographic variables, so it 
seems that the demographic variables are not as good at modeling the abortion rates by 
state of occurrence. Regressions 10 (women ages 35 to 39) and 14 (non-Hispanic other) 
have the greatest increases in the estimated coefficient with the addition of demographic 
variables, indicating that these subpopulations are the most sensitive to the inclusion or 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ACA Only All ACA Only All 11-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 White Black Other Hispanic 
*Models include fixed effects, selected state-specific trends, population weights, and effect coding of 2013=0.75.
Figure 32: Abortion ACA Mandate Regression Coefficients:*
Results Including All Demographic Variables
 






























Figure 33: Ratios of Adjusted R-Squared Values from the Abortion 
Analysis Model with and without Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at the 
alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate either one or both estimated coefficients in 





6.1.6 Lasso-Selected Demographic Variables 
The full demographic variable list included in the regressions in Section 6.1.5 was 
informed by literature and supporting theory. However, as discussed in Section 4.2.5, the 
lasso2 procedure was used in Stata to select the demographic variables for each of the 
fifteen regressions to avoid overspecification and to find the best fit for each 
subpopulation. The full regression results are available in Appendix Table 13. Similar to 
Figures in the previous section, Figure 35 graphs the ratio of adjusted R-squared values 
and Figure 36 graphs the ratios of the ACA mandate estimated coefficients for models 
with all demographic variables versus only the lasso-selected demographic variables 
(coefficients from Table 13 and Appendix Table 13, respectively). 
Surprisingly, as seen in Figure 35, the adjusted R-squared value was lower in all 


























Figure 34: Ratios of ACA Mandate Estimated Coefficients from the 
Abortion Analysis Model with and without Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant at the 
alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate either one or both estimated coefficients in 




compared to the regressions with the full list of demographic variables (Table 13). Two 
regressions (women ages 40 to 44 and “non-Hispanic other”) have a negative ratio 
because the adjusted R-squared value changes from a positive value with all demographic 
variables to a small negative value with lasso-selected variables (see Appendix Table 13). 
Because the adjusted R-squared indicates that there is a better overall model fit when 
including the full list of demographic variables, the model using the full list of 
demographic variables (presented in Section 6.2.5 with results in Table 13) was 
determined to be the best fit for modeling the impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate 
on abortion rates. Since the lasso2 command removed nearly all or all of the demographic 
variables for most of the fifteen regressions, and consistently removed more demographic 
variables in the smaller population subgroup regressions, this could suggest that the 
demographic variables used are not capturing their relationship with the abortion rate as 
well for some subgroups. 
Figure 36 shows that the estimated ACA mandate coefficient was higher for all 
but regression three (all women by state of abortion occurrence), which is just two 
percent smaller with lasso-selected demographic variables. Regression 10 (women ages 
35 to 39) has the highest ratio of estimated coefficients with the full demographic 
variables versus lasso-selected variables. This is not surprising given the high ratio 
observed for this same subgroup in Figure 34, which compares estimated coefficients 
with and without demographic variables and the lasso2 command removed all 
demographic variables for this subgroup. This provides further evidence that the 
demographic variables are especially not as good at modeling the relationship with 
































Figure 35: Ratios of Adjusted R-Squared Values
from the Abortion Analysis Model with All versus 
Lasso-Selected Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant 
at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate either one or both 























Figure 36: Ratios of ACA Mandate Estimated Coefficients 
from the Abortion Analysis Model with All versus 
Lasso-Selected Demographic Variables
Note: Solid blue circles indicate that both estimated coefficients in the ratio were statistically significant 
at the alpha=0.05 level. Ratios marked with the black outline of a circle indicate either one or both 




6.2 Abortion Discussion 
This section will first discuss the selection of the final model before discussing 
the details of the final model’s results, strengths and limitations, and policy implications. 
6.2.1 Discussion of Final Model Determination 
As outlined in Figure 18, a series of six tests were done to determine the final 
model. This discussion will go through each test in the order it was done. 
The Hausman Test results reported in Table 10 indicated that fixed effects must 
be used for seven of the fifteen test statistics in order to avoid estimation bias. Thus, fixed 
effects were used for all models to ensure unbiased estimates and for consistency across 
regression subcategories.  
After it was determined to use fixed effects for all models, whether to include 
state-specific time trends was then investigated. Figure 29 reports the ratio of adjusted R-
squared values for regressions with and without the state-specific trend lines to evaluate 
the relative goodness of fit across the two methods. As part of the state-specific trend 
analysis, Figure 30 was included to graph the impact on the ACA contraception mandate 
parameter via a ratio between the estimated coefficients with and without state-specific 
trends included in the model. These results supported including the time trends for these 
three states in the final model. Including these state trend lines increased the adjusted R-
squared without negatively affecting the statistical power of the model. Additionally, 
estimated coefficients between the two models were relatively similar, indicating the 
robustness of the model regardless whether state time trends were included. 
In order to determine the impact of population weighting, the most populous 




11, which show minimal impact from omitting large states. However, as explained in 
Section 4.2.3, there may be some policy questions where not using population weighting 
would be preferred, so this decision about population weighting should be dependent 
upon the policy or research question. 
The analysis that tested various effect coding methods, reported in Table 12, 
Figures 31.1 to 31.3, and Appendix Table 12, showed that the results were generally 
robust regardless of the effect coding method used. Thus, the effect coding method of 
2013=0.75 was selected for the final model because it seemed to be the most accurate 
reflection of when the ACA contraceptive mandate most likely began to impact abortion 
rates. 
After the first four modeling decisions were made, the eleven demographic 
variables were added to the model. Because this model is the final model selected, the 
discussion of the specific results presented in Table 13 and Figure 32 will occur in 
Section 6.1.2. The adjusted R-squared values are equal or greater in the model with 
demographic variables (Table 13) than without (Appendix Table 12) in all but three 
regressions—regressions three and four (the two regressions with all women by state of 
abortion occurrence) and regression eight (women ages 25 to 29). For most regressions, 
adding in additional demographic variables yields a better model of abortion rates, as 
seen by increased adjusted R-squared values. For this reason, the full list of demographic 
variables were included in the final model. 
Finally, the lasso2 procedure was used to determine whether the models would 
better fit when the demographic variables were specifically selected for each 




lasso-selected demographic variables (see Appendix Table 13) compared to the 
regressions with the full demographic variables (see Table 13). Thus, the models with the 
full demographic variable list were selected as the final model. 
6.2.2 Discussion of Final Model Results and Trends 
The final model results presented in Table 13 generally show a statistically 
significant reduction in the abortion rate for fourteen of the fifteen regression 
subpopulations. None of the regressions yielded statistically significant coefficients for 
the state-specific mandates, though eight of the thirteen models with the interaction term 
for the ACA mandate and state-specific mandates had statistically significant estimated 
reductions in the abortion rate. As the results vary by subpopulation, the specific results 
will be discussed individually. 
The first two regressions are the only regressions run on abortion rates by the 
woman’s state of residence, while all others are based on abortion rates by the state of 
abortion occurrence. The first regression—which only has one policy variable 
representing the ACA mandate—shows an estimated decrease in the abortion rate of 
4.375 abortions per 1,000 women (95% CI [-5.777, -2.974]). The second regression 
includes all three policy variables and estimates a decrease in the abortion rate of 4.677 
abortions per 1,000 women (95% CI [-6.055, -3.299]) and an additional decrease of 0.877 
abortions per 1,000 women (95% CI [-1.347, -0.406]) for states with a state-specific 
contraceptive mandate. As a reference point, the US 2012 abortion rate was 12.6 
abortions per 1,000 women (see Table 4). These two estimated coefficients combined 




The next two regressions follow the same model as the first two regressions but 
are run on abortion data reported by state of abortion occurrence. It would be ideal to 
have all data by the woman’s state of residence, but since those data are not available, 
these first four regressions are included to show estimated differences in results when 
using the two types of abortion data. The estimated effect of the ACA mandate is smaller 
but still statistically significant for both models, with a decrease of 4.007 abortions per 
1,000 women (95% CI [-5.550, -2.465]) for the ACA-only model and -3.955 abortions 
per 1,000 women (95% CI [-5.494, -2.417]) for the model with all three policy variables. 
The ACA-state policy interaction term for regression four was statistically insignificant. 
The third category of regressions includes seven regressions by the age category 
of the mother. All age categories except for women ages 40 to 44 have statistically 
significant estimated effects of the ACA contraceptive mandate on the abortion rate. The 
greatest estimated decrease is for women ages 20 to 24—13.93 abortions per 1,000 
women (95% CI [-16.695, -11.168], 2012 US mean: 23.3 abortions per 1,000 women, see 
Table 4)—and the smallest estimated decrease is for women ages 11 to 14—0.392 
abortions per 1,000 women (95% CI [-0.509, -0.275], 2012 US mean: 0.8 abortions per 
1,000 women, see Table 4). All age categories except for the youngest (11 to 14) and 
oldest (40 to 44) have statistically significant ACA-state policy interaction terms showing 
an additional decrease in the abortion rate for states with contraceptive mandates ranging 
from 0.312 abortions per 1,000 women ages 35 to 39 (95% CI [-0.593, -0.031]) to 2.029 
abortions per 1,000 women ages 20 to 24 (95% CI [-3.029, -1.029]). These results make 
sense as the age groups with the highest abortion rates shown in Figure 14 have the 




The final category of regressions includes four race/ethnicity subcategories, all of 
which have a statistically significant estimated decrease in the abortion rate. None of 
these subcategories have a statistically significant ACA-state policy interaction term. The 
estimated decrease is the largest for non-Hispanic Black women at 10.56 abortions per 
1,000 women (95% CI [-16.054, -5.073], 2012 US mean: 27.8 abortions per 1,000 
women, see Table 4). This is roughly three times the estimated decrease for non-Hispanic 
White women, which is 3.201 abortions per 1,000 women (95% CI [-4.571, -1.831], 2012 
US mean: 7.7 abortions per 1,000 women). The estimated decrease for Hispanic women 
falls between that of non-Hispanic White and non-Hispanic Black women, at 6.589 
abortions per 1,000 women (95% CI [-11.980, 01.198], 2012 US mean: 15.0 abortions 
per 1,000 women). It makes sense that non-Hispanic Black women had the highest 
estimated impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on abortion rates because, as shown 
in Figure 15, non-Hispanic Black women have the highest abortion rates of the four 
racial/ethnic subcategories.  
There is a range of estimated impacts of the demographic variables across the 
fifteen abortion regressions. Some demographic variables behave exactly as the literature 
would have predicted. For example, data and published literature show that married 
women are less likely to have abortions, and the fifteen regressions are nearly unanimous 
on an inverse relationship between the percent married and the abortion rate. The four 
demographic variables parsed into quartiles have regression estimates for the second 
through fourth quartile, with the first quartile of each variable used as the reference. 
Thus, it makes sense, for example, that states with the percent of population with a high 




states in the first quartile of high school degrees, as evidenced by six of the seven 
regressions with statistically significant second quartile high school degrees showing a 
negative impact of the ACA contraceptive mandate on the abortion rate. However, 
interpreting variables parsed into quartiles (such as the high school degree variable just 
discussed) can feel somewhat confusing because a predominantly inverse relationship can 
change to an insignificant or direct relationship in the higher quartiles, or vice versa. 
Because of this confusion, it is important to remember that this flexible modeling was 
used precisely so that the changing relationship between the demographic variable and 
the abortion rate could be more accurately captured by the model. For example, states 
with the lowest quartile of median household income may be, on average, less able to 
afford abortions than higher quartiles. However, the highest quartile, though more likely 
to be able to afford abortion, may also be more able to afford contraceptives that would 
have avoided the unintended pregnancy that led to the abortion. These effects, in short, 
must be interpreted with care. Finally, it is important to remember that the demographic 
variables are based on state-level data, so the estimated coefficients for demographic 
variables for subpopulations should be interpreted cautiously.  
Perhaps most surprising in the abortion analysis is the relative size of the 
estimated effects to the country-wide mean abortion rates in 2012. The final model with 
the full list of demographic variables estimates an average 45.8 percent decrease in the 
2012 abortion rates due to the ACA contraceptive mandate (range: 31.3 percent to 95.4 
percent). Even when looking at the more modest estimates from the models with lasso-
selected variables, the mean estimated effect is a 26.5 percent decrease in the abortion 




Though relatively large, this range seems less concerning given evidence in the 
literature on similar policy interventions and contraceptive use and unintended pregnancy 
post-ACA implementation. A previous study on the effect of free contraceptives in the 
Contraceptive CHOICE Project in St. Louis found a greater than 75 percent decrease in 
the abortion rate attributable to the provision of free contraceptives in their study 
population (McNicholas, Madden, Secura, & Peipert, 2014). Additionally, although most 
studies have found relatively modest estimated increases in contraceptive use post-ACA 
implementation (Kim & Look, 2018; Snyder, et al., 2018), one study that stratified results 
into groups by sexual activity found that OCP use doubled (21 percent to 40 percent) for 
women ages 18 to 24 who had not had sex in the previous month (Bearak & Jones, 2017). 
This is an age group with relatively high rates of unintended pregnancy and relatively 
high abortion rates. If these women were not having frequent sex, they may 
underestimate their risk of pregnancy and choose to not use consistent prescription 
contraceptives, especially if affording birth control would be difficult. However, this 
means that this group of women is at higher risk of unintended pregnancy when they do 
have sex because they are limited to barrier methods or emergency contraceptives. 
Furthermore, infrequent sex is less predictable, meaning that women in this demographic 
may be less consistently prepared in the moment to prevent pregnancy via barrier 
methods. Doubling the rate of consistent OCP use in this population could very likely 
have a large impact on the unintended pregnancy rates and abortion rates of this 
subgroup. 
Additionally, as mentioned in Section 2.3, a recent study found the unintended 




among women with government-sponsored health insurance (MacCallum-Bridges & 
Margerison, 2020). If these estimated decreases in the unintended pregnancy rate prove 
accurate, they would give greater credibility to the estimated decrease in abortion rates 
due to the ACA. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the ACA contraceptive mandate had a 
significant impact on abortion rates. It is absolutely true that the ACA contraceptive 
mandate massively shifted contraceptive costs from individuals to insurance companies 
and the government, but the ACA contraceptive mandate did not address many of the 
other barriers generally associated with contraceptive access, such as awareness of 
individual pregnancy risk, contraceptive knowledge, or more convenient physical access 
to contraceptives. It seems, then, that if the ACA contraceptive mandate were combined 
with any other efforts to address barriers to contraception, the impact on the abortion rate 
could be even greater.  
6.2.3 Strengths  
This work is the first study that utilizes abortion data to model the effect of both 
the ACA and state-specific contraceptive mandates on abortion rates. These models 
generally pass checks for robustness and fill a substantial research gap on the effect of the 
ACA contraceptive mandate on abortion rates. Breaking out the results into various 
subpopulations greatly increases the specificity of the results, as pre- and post-ACA 
unintended pregnancy rates and abortion rates varied greatly by subpopulation. 
Similar to the fertility analysis, this work is the first to include binary variables for 




the same model, which allows for more accurate estimation of each policy’s impact on 
the abortion rate.  
6.2.4 Limitations 
The main limitations are due to available data and the changing political and 
economic climate during the study period.  
The abortion data that are available are far from perfect. Not all states report any 
data, and not all states report all data by subcategories. Furthermore, the abortion data are 
not broken down into as many subpopulations as other data on reproduction. For 
example, there is no simultaneous breakdown of age with race or ethnicity, so there is no 
way to estimate the isolated effect of the ACA contraceptive mandate on the 
subpopulations likely to be impacted the most by this policy (younger and racial/ethnic 
minority). Finally, the majority of the abortion data are reported by the state of abortion 
occurrence instead of the state of the mother’s residence, which limits the ability to 
accurately attribute state-level effects to state abortion rates. 
The relative lack of specificity of the demographic data also limits this analysis. 
As discussed in Section 5.2.4, because the demographic data are not available for all the 
subpopulations at the state level, the state level means for the total state population are 
used for all state subpopulations. Although this has less of an effect on subpopulations 
that are in the majority (in most states, White) as their subpopulation’s demographic data 
are more strongly correlated with state-level demographic data, it potentially has a much 
larger effect on estimates involving minority subpopulations. 
Finally, the political and economic circumstances themselves were changing at 




time when there was rapid growth in the number of laws restricting abortions and 
shutting down abortion facilities, which affected abortion access. Additionally, economic 
fluctuations affect fertility preferences and some areas of the US saw a stark increase in 
the unemployment rate in this time period. Although the models include variables to try 
to account for these forces—the number of abortion clinics per 100,000 women as well as 
the state unemployment rate and state mean household income—these variables may not 
sufficiently capture the larger changes occurring during the time period. This is especially 
the case because many of the most dramatic changes in unemployment, for example, 
occurred in specific cities that had previously been dominated by the manufacturing 
industry. Thus, the state-level averages would dramatically understate the effect of the 
economy on women who live in geographic areas with relatively much higher 
unemployment than the state average. 
6.2.5 Policy Implications 
There are three main policy implications of this research: 1. Fund contraceptive 
coverage; 2. Provide funding to improve the abortion data reported to the CDC; and 3. 
Enable continued research on this topic.  
This research provides evidence that there should be bipartisan support for 
funding contraceptive coverage because the ACA contraceptive mandate was estimated 
to have caused statistically significant reductions in abortion rates for all subpopulations 
except for women ages 40 to 44. Even if the federal government strikes down the ACA 
contraceptive mandate entirely or continues to weaken it through broadening the 
exceptions for employer-based health insurance policies, state policies—including their 




governments do not take this action, insurance companies should choose to fully cover 
contraceptives to avoid the costs of unintended pregnancy and abortion. Although only 
five states—California, Maine, New York, Oregon, and Washington—now require all 
insurance plans sold on the Marketplace that cover any maternity care to also include 
abortion coverage, an additional twelve states plus DC offer at least one plan on the 
Marketplace that includes abortion coverage (Salganicoff, 2019). Even if the costs of 
both contraceptives and abortion procedures and the morality of abortion were not at 
play, having multiple abortions may cause negative health effects in terms of future pre-
term birth, which can have life-long effects on the child (National Academies of 
Sciences, 2018). Reducing the abortion rate via increasing contraceptive use could save 
money and improve population health outcomes. 
Second, funding should be allocated to continue the Abortion Surveillance reports 
and work to improve the abortion data quality. There is so much that is still unknown 
because of the limitations of the data currently included in the Abortion Surveillance 
reports. For example, it would be helpful to gather more data by the state of the woman’s 
residence rather than just the state of occurrence to better understand what local laws are 
affecting choice and to have a better idea of the demographics of who is getting 
abortions. It would be helpful to gather more racial and ethnicity information, and 
especially helpful to gather and report data by age group plus race and ethnicity. These 
additional data would allow for much more detailed findings. Although states may be 
reluctant to add more required data to the reporting, these data will help states better 




Finally, funding either via HHS, the CDC, post-docs, or training grants should be 
made available to fund further research on this topic. It would be especially helpful to be 
able to include more specific demographic data to use in the regressions by 
subpopulation. Including geospatial data to estimate the mean distance or traveling time 
to the nearest abortion facility may also be a variable worth including. 
Prioritizing contraceptive coverage and further research on this topic will increase 






This dissertation addressed two specific research aims estimating the effect of the 
ACA contraceptive mandate on (1) fertility rates and (2) abortion rates in the US. Various 
tests led to final models with fixed effects, selected state-specific time trends, population 
weights, effect coding, and either full demographic variable inclusion or lasso-selected 
demographic variables.  
In general, both the fertility and abortion findings were robust to model 
specification selection. The main findings for all women generally confirm prior studies’ 
results with small but statistically significant decreases in the fertility and abortion rates 
due to the ACA contraceptive mandate. In addition to modeling data from the time period 
pre- and post-ACA implementation, this work adds to the research literature by including 
the effects of the prior state-specific contraceptive mandates as well as the many 
additional regression models by demographic subpopulation. It is the results for these 
subpopulations that provide crucial information for future policy specificity. 
This work found a larger estimated impact on abortion rates (mean of 26.5 
percent) than fertility rates (mean of 6.8 to 8.1 percent). This non-linear relationship 
between the decreased fertility rates and decreased abortion rates implies that the ACA 
contraceptive mandate did not randomly prevent pregnancies but instead focused on 
certain demographics that were more prone to unintended pregnancy and abortion. It 
seems reasonable, then, to conclude that the ACA contraceptive mandate shifted some 
women who had previously relied on abortion if they got pregnant to using 
contraceptives to prevent pregnancy or that the ACA prevented unintended pregnancies 




It is crucial to understand the impact the ACA contraceptive mandate is estimated 
to have had on fertility rates and abortion rates. In addition to cost-savings, there are 
gains in health and utility in avoiding unintended pregnancy. Furthermore, if society as a 
whole would like to reduce abortion rates, access to contraceptives must be prioritized. 
This is especially the case if relatively more vulnerable populations experience a 
disproportionate share of unintended pregnancies and abortions. In light of this 
dissertation’s findings, the federal government and the Supreme Court should carefully 
consider what exceptions should be allowed to the contraceptive mandate. If future 
funding of a contraceptive mandate is limited, priority should be given to continuing 
funding for providing contraceptives for younger minority women, as they saw the 
biggest decreases in fertility and abortion rates. 
The ACA contraceptive mandate only focused on one of many barriers to 
contraceptive use: the cost to the individual. It was not combined with outreach, 
information campaigns, or transportation to doctor’s appointments. However, it had a 
substantial impact on fertility and abortion rates. Further public health work and 
additional research should be pursued to see if other interventions done in conjunction 
with the contraceptive mandate could improve outcomes even more.  
The COVID-19 pandemic is currently impacting reproductive health. One study 
conducted in May 2020 found that at this earlier stage of the pandemic, women were 
reporting increased barriers to in-person physician appointments for contraceptives 
(Lindberg, et al., 2020). However, the current COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to 
improve women’s future access to contraceptives via the much greater prevalence and 




to prescription contraceptives) has the potential to further reduce physical barriers to 
physicians, including transportation access and associated time costs. If continued after 
the pandemic, telemedicine has the potential to improve reproductive health long-term for 
many women, including those who have less flexible employment that make attending 
appointments in-person more difficult. To fully take advantage of this opportunity, 
additional work needs to be done to ensure that the most vulnerable populations are 
aware of this option and have the necessary internet connection for telemedicine 
appointments.  
There are many exciting avenues for improving reproductive healthcare both now 
and long-term. Investing in women’s health has been shown to deliver positive returns 
(Karpilow, et al., 2013), and should inspire us to move forward with boldness in 








8.1.1 Utility Function Discussion 
In a world where there is only one good, x, the utility function is simply the 
product of the average utility gained per item and the number of items consumed:  
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥 = 𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆���������𝑥𝑥 ∗  𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥 
In a world where there are only two goods, x and y, the total utility would be a 
sum of the utility gained by the individual from consuming the quantity purchased of 
each good: 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 = (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆���������𝑥𝑥 ∗  𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥) + (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆���������𝑦𝑦 ∗  𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦) 
The aggregate utility of a group of individuals or society as a whole would simply 
be the sum of the n individual’s utility functions: 




Discussion of consumer behavior gets interesting because resources are finite, so 
individuals must make decisions to maximize their utility given their income or budget 
constraints and the prices of each good, such that 
𝐼𝐼𝑞𝑞𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≥  (𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑥𝑥 ∗  𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥) + (𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦 ∗  𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦) 
When individuals encounter purchasing decisions, they generally do so in a 
setting where prices are exogenous, meaning that they are price takers instead of price 




The amount of utility the individual derives from each good (which is entirely controlled 
by the individual), 2. The individual income (which is generally assumed to be fixed in 







8.1.2 Additional Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
Appendix Table 1: State-Specific Contraceptive Mandates 
State Year Enacted Religious Exemption Via Leglislation
Arizona 2002 Yes Yes
Arkansas 2005 Yes Yes
California 1999 Yes Yes
Colorado 2010 No Yes
Connecticut 1999 Yes Yes
Delaware 2000 Yes Yes
Georgia 1999 No Yes
Hawaii 1999 Yes Yes
Illinois 2003 Yes Yes
Iowa 2000 No Yes
Maine 1999 Yes Yes
Maryland 1998 Yes Yes
Massachusetts 2002 Yes Yes
Michigan* 2006 Yes No
Missouri 2001 Yes Yes
Montana* 2006 No No
Nevada 1999 Yes Yes
New Hampshire 1999 No Yes
New Jersey 2005 Yes Yes
New Mexico 2001 Yes Yes
New York 2002 Yes Yes
North Carolina 1999 Yes Yes
Oregon 2007 Yes Yes
Rhode Island 2000 Yes Yes
Texas 2001 Yes Yes
Vermont 1999 No Yes
Virginia 2001 No Yes
Washington 2007 No Yes
West Virginia 2005 Yes Yes
Wisconsin 2009 No Yes
*Note: Michigan and Montana both had state contraceptive mandates enacted via attorney 





Appendix Table 2: State EHB Benchmark Plans and Infertility Coverage Laws
State
EHB Benchmark Plan 
Requires Infertility 
Coverage
State Law Requires 
Infertility Coverage
State Law Requires 


















New Jersey Yes Yes
New Mexico Yes
New York Yes Yes
North Carolina Yes
Ohio Yes





West Virginia Yes Yes
Wyoming Yes
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. "Plan Year 2014-2016 Essential Health Benefits 






Appendix Table 3: Correlation of Statewide Demographic Variables with Subgroups
Variable Subgroup Correlation States Years
NH White 0.6068 51 2011-2016
NH Black 0.2062 49 2011-2016
NH Asian 0.0115 51 2011-2016
Hispanic 0.4144 51 2011-2016
NH White 0.8963 51 2011-2016
NH Black 0.5826 48 2011-2016
NH Asian 0.4074 51 2011-2016
Hispanic 0.5129 51 2011-2016
Percent with High School 
Education or Higher



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Figure 1: US State-Specific Crude Fertility 
Rates, All Women Ages 15-44, 2007-2017
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Appendix Figure 2.1a: ACA Estimated Coefficients, States
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Appendix Figure 2.1b: ACA Estimated Coefficients, States















































































































Appendix Figure 2.2a: ACA Estimated Coefficients, States
without EHB ART Requirement, By Age Group and Race
 







































































































Appendix Figure 2.2b: ACA Estimated Coefficients, States
with EHB ART Requirement, By Age Group and Race
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Appendix Figure 2.3a: ACA Estimated Coefficients, States
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Appendix Figure 2.3b: ACA Estimated Coefficients, States

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Figure 3: US State-Specific Abortion Trend Lines, 
All Women Ages 11-44, 2009-2016
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